Higher Ed  Do Not Resuscitate  Orders by Bruckner, Matthew Adam
Kentucky Law Journal 
Volume 106 Issue 2 Article 4 
2017 
Higher Ed "Do Not Resuscitate" Orders 
Matthew Adam Bruckner 
Howard University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj 
 Part of the Education Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Bruckner, Matthew Adam (2017) "Higher Ed "Do Not Resuscitate" Orders," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 106 
: Iss. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol106/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact 
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Higher Ed "Do Not Resuscitate" Orders
Matthew Adam Bruckner'
ABSTRACT
Congress has effectively precluded all institutions of higher education from
reorganizing in the bankruptcy courts because it was concerned about exploitative
profiteers opening fiy-by-night colleges, defrauding students, and then finding
refuge in bankruptcy. This choice harms students, employees, creditors, and
communities. As such, this Article advocates that Congress should reverse its
decision and allow IHEs to reorganize in bankruptcy without losing access to
federal student loan and grant programs. To support this argument, this Article
contrasts the bankruptcy treatment of healthcare enterprises to that of higher
education enterprises. In doing so, this Article builds on my own prior work and
contributes to the literature on higher education bankruptcies.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 24, 1888, the Saint Paul Normal and Industrial School opened
its doors in Lawrenceville, Virginia to fewer than a dozen African American
students.2 Over the next 125 years, St. Paul became a hub for training the region's
educators.' The school grew over the years, adding programs and students, but
always remaining focused on serving those most in need.4 St. Paul, like many other
historically black colleges and universities ("HBCUs"), primarily educated poor
students from underserved communities, who were often the first in their families
to attend college.s As a result, St. Paul "lacked a wealthy donor base or strong
endowment" with which to weather financial troubles.6 Due in part to its weak
financial condition, St. Paul's accrediting body stripped the college of its
accreditation in June 2012.' Approximately one year later, on June 30, 2013, the
college dosed its doors forever.'
Auburn Memorial Hospital ("Auburn") is a private, nonprofit medical
enterprise in New York that admitted its first patient in 1880.' Auburn served
patients in various settings, including an in-patient hospital, two outpatient care
centers, and "a rehabilitation and long-term residential health care facility.""o It was
the sole provider of certain hospital services to 80,000 Cayuga County residents,"
2 Saint Paul's College (Virginia), WIKIPEDIA,
https*//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint Paul%27sCollege_(Virginia) [httpsi//perma.cc/73Z4-C2EL] (last
updated June 7, 2017, 2:20 PM); Vanessa LeAnne Patterson, Saint Pauds College of Virginia (1888--),
BLACKPAST.ORG, http://www.blackpast.org/aah/saint-paul-s-college-virginia-1888
[httpsl//perma.cc/6R6J-5MUQ] (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
Ben Jealous, St. Pauds College and the Future of IHBCUs, HUFFPosT: THE BLOC (Sept. 20,
2013, 10:15 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/benjamin-todd-jealous/st-pauls-college-and-
the-b_3961623.html [https://perma.cc/7AKF-VTJV].
4 See Patterson, supra note 2.
'Jealous, supra note 3.
6 id.
St. Paul was accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, which terminated
St. Paul's accreditation. Denise B. Hawkins, After 125 Years of Service, St. Pauds College Shutting
Down June 30, DIVERSE (May 31, 2013), http-//diverseeducation.com/article/53664/
[https://perma.cc/6LZR-2AS5]; Scott Jaschik, Saint Paudv Loses Accreditation, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(June 22, 2012), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/06/22/southern-accreditor-strips-st-
pauls-recognition [https://perma.cc/R8PW-GRN6] (reporting that St. Paul's regulator was concerned
about its "financial resources, institutional effectiveness in support services, institutional effectiveness in
academics and student services, lack of terminal degrees for too many faculty members, and a lack of
financial stability.").
'Hawkins, supra note 7.
'Aff. of John D. Baran in Supp. of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions and Pursuant o
Local Rule 2015-6 at 1 6, In re Auburn Mem'l Hosp., No. 07-31126 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007)
[hereinafter Baran Aff.].
1o Id. at ¶¶ 6-8.
" Id. at ¶ 7.
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and cared for thousands of patients each year.'2 By 2007, Auburn had become a
regional economic engine, contributing approximately $170 million annually to the
local economy.'3 It was also one of its county's largest employers, employing
approximately 800 people.'4 But after losing money for several consecutive years,
the hospital's poor finances nearly caused it to dose.15 Unlike St. Paul, however,
Auburn successfully reorganized in bankruptcy by streamlining its operations and
finances, including shedding burdensome debt, and investing in new technologies
and an upgraded physical plant.6
In some ways, Auburn and St. Paul suffered similar fates. Both were valued in
their time, prospering as they served their regions and using federal funds to do
so." Although both enterprises were buffeted by market forces, Auburn overcame
its financial troubles, hired additional doctors and new staff, and is stronger than
ever."' By contrast, St. Paul permanently dosed its doors after tying, unsuccessfully, to
merge with a financially stronger college."
' Scott Rapp, Three Years After Fing for Bankruptcy, Auburn Hospital Posts Record Profits,
POST-STANDARD (Apr. 10, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2010/04/three-years fter-filing-for-b.html
[https//perma.cc/34CG-D4JM].
' See Samantha House, Auburn Community Hospital's Strategic Plan Includes $95
Milon Worth of Renovations, Constmction, CMZEN (Mar. 30, 2014),
http//auburnpub.com/news/ocal/auburn-community-hospital-s-strategic-plan-indudes-
million-worth-of/article4a26c8f5-bl7b-593e-a43a-6bbl3e73d000.html
[https://perma.cc/YW3A-3XPG].
14 See Baran Aff., supra note 9, at 1 10 (noting that Auburn had approximately 815 employees at
the time of its bankruptcy filing, including 536 full-time employees, 239 part-time employees, and 40
per diem workers).
' See Rapp, supra note 12; see also Rachel Fields, 10 Successful Hospital Turnarounds, BECKER'S
HOSP. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 25, https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/pdfs/hospital-
review/JanFeb_2011_HRpdf [https://perma.cc/VU3W-5L92] ("Over the course of a decade, Auburn
Memorial Hospital experienced a prolonged period of financial contraction due to the departure of
physicians, patients and service lines. Cash reserves were reduced, and the hospital found itself unable to
invest. The hospital declared bankruptcy in April 2007.").
16Amaris Elliott-Engel, Hospital Declares Chapter 11 Banknuptcy, CITIZEN (Apr. 25, 2007),
http://auburnpub.com/news/local/hospital-declares-chapter-bankruptcy/article f506f808-10cd-5bf9-
aeb3-02b1dd4c2e43.html [httpsJ/perma.cc/UF7C-73KV] ("Capital investment goals include
modernizing the hospital's operating rooms, instituting an electronic medical record system, renovating
the heating and air conditioning system, renovating the Memorial wing into single-bed patient rooms[,]
and moving the hospital's psychiatric ward into the main campus."). Auburn's use of chapter 11 is not
atypical for struggling hospitals. See, e.g., Lawton R. Burns et al., The Fal of the House ofA1IERF:
The Allegheny Bankmptcy, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 7, 8, 33-34,
https-//www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaffE19.1.7 [https://perma.cc/L84P-NABR]; Steve
Massey, Introduction: Hear No Evil, See No Evil, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, http://olpost-
gazette.com/aherf/intro.asp [https://perna.cc/JM8Q-MYFJ] (last visited Dec. 29, 2017) (describing the
reorganization of Allegheny Health, Education, and Research Foundation ("AHERF")).
17 See infia note 35 and accompanying text.
s Rapp, supra note 12 (noting that post-bankruptcy, Auburn added additional doctors).
19 See Hawkins, supra note 7. A year after closing, St. Paul signed a lease with the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") "to house around 500 undocumented and unaccompanied
children," but even that plan was scrapped after residents objected. See Nick Dutton & Joe St. George,
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St. Paul's failure to overcome its financial woes was exacerbated by its inability
to take advantage of the tools available under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which contains the bankruptcy reorganization provisions.20 One solution to St.
Paul's financial difficulties might have been for another college to acquire St. Paul;
and supporters did explore a possible acquisition by St. Augustine's University,
another HBCU.2'1 But the potential merger was abandoned in May 2013, citing St.
Paul's debt, among other things.22 Outside of bankruptcy, St. Augustine's would
have needed to assume St. Paul's debt, which was estimated at between four and
five million dollars.23 In bankruptcy, such debts are eligible to be discharged, which
could have paved the way for St. Augustine's acquisition.24 But for reasons
discussed later in this Article, that option is not available to institutions of higher
education ("IHEs"). 25 As a result, St. Paul dosed, leaving Lawrenceville, Virginia
with a vacant 184-acre campus, forcing students to switch colleges, and costing the
local community valuable jobs. 26 By contrast, Auburn used chapter 11 to
successfiully reorganize, keeping its facilities open for patients and preserving jobs
and community resources.27
As discussed extensively elsewhere, all IHEs are effectively precluded from
reorganizing in bankruptcy.28 IHEs are economically precluded from reorganizing
Plans to Use St Pals College for Immigrant Kids on Hold, CBS 6 (une 16, 2014),
http-//wtvr.com/2014/06/16/ex-st-pauls-college-campus-may-be-used-to-house-undocunented-
unaccompanied-children/ [https://perma.ce/FB2K-QF5R]; see also Karin Kapsidelis, Plan to Use Saint
Pauls to Shelter Immigrant Children Dropped RIcHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH Gune 20, 2014),
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/plan-to-use-saint-paul-s-to-shelter-immigrant-
children/articlece549712-f4d3-5721-86ca-4ad76aalad8c.html [https://perma.cc/F7CV-BM4Q].
20 See infra Section L.B; see also Scott F. Norberg, Bankruptcy and Lbgher Education Institutions,
23 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 385,385 (2015) ("Whatever the fate of financially distressed colleges and
universities, one point is clear. reorganization in bankruptcy is not an option for institutions that receive
federal student financial aid funding from the United States Department of Education ('DOE')
pursuant to title IV of the Higher Education Act.") (footnote omitted). Although they cannot be
reorganized in bankruptcy, they may be liquidated there. See infra Section III.B.ii.
21 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
' Hawkins, supra note 7.
23 Id.
24 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (2012).
25 See discussion infra Section III; see alo Matthew Adam Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher
Education, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 698 (2017) ("colleges face 'an effective death sentence' if they file
[for] bankruptcy") (footnotes omitted); Norberg, supra note 20, at 385, 387-88, 390. This Article will
refer to "THEs" to mean any degree-granting, post-secondary education institution, whether it is a
college, university, professional, or technical school.
26 See Hawkins, supra note 7.
27 See Baran Aff., supra note 9, at 1 14, 19; Rapp, supra note 12.
28 See, e.g., Bruckner, supra note 25 (expanding on Norberg's analysis by examining how for-profit
and nonprofit status affect the usefulness of bankruptcy for IHEs); Norberg, supra note 20 (discussing
the reasons why and mechanisms by which IHEs have been effectively excluded from reorganizing
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code); see also infra Section III (suggesting arguments against
excluding IHEs); Karen Gross, Fresh Start for Higher Ed- Can the US Bankruptcy Laws Help?,
ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW (forthcoming, 2018) (on file with author).
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in bankruptcy even though they are not legally barred from doing so.2 9 As a matter
of law, any IHE may seek to voluntarily reorganize in bankruptcy.' However,
doing so automatically, immediately, and irrevocably, terminates that IHE's
eligibility to participate in the federal student loan and grant programs."' Therefore,
only a school that is willing to give up access to the funds available under Title IV
of the Higher Education Act (the "HEA") 3 2 may reorganize in bankruptcy.3 3
Because Title IV funds are critical to most IHE's survival, virtually no IHEs have
successfully reorganized in bankruptcy since the law was changed to terminate an
IHE's Title IV eligibility upon its bankruptcy filing.3 4
Essentially, Congress has imposed an involuntary "do not resuscitate" order on
IHEs, condemning some socially valuable enterprises to an unnecessary death.3 s
This treatment is unusual, as IHEs are one of the only types of enterprises that are
29 See Matthew Bruckner, Comment to Enron &1TT Tech, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 9,2016,2:52
PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/09/enron-itt-tech.html [https-//perma.cc/FJ85-
53TT] (explaining the "functional[] prohibition" on bankruptcy reorganization for IHEs); accord
Norberg, supra note 25; Bruckner, supra note 25.
' For example, though it was ultimately unsuccessful, Shepherd University recently tried to
reorganize in chapter 11. See Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion to Convert Case to Chapter 7;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Declaration of Bradley D. Sharp in Support Thereof at 3,
In re Shepherd University, No. 2:17-bk-19964 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2018) ECF No. 151 (noting
that the university has ceased operating and seeking to convert the case and liquidate the college's
remaining assets).
3 20 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4)(A) (2012) (excluding an institution from the definition of "institution of
higher education"-and therefore from Title IV eligibility-if that institution "has filed for
bankruptcy.") Involuntary bankruptcies also appear to terminate an IHE's Title IV eligibility. See 34
C.F.R § 600.7(a)(2)(B) (2017) (providing that an educational institution does not qualify to receive
Title IV dollars if the institution "has entered against i an order for relief in bankruptcy," which would
include involuntary bankruptcies); see also Bruckner, Comment, supra note 29 (noting that as a matter
of law, IHEs can file for bankruptcy, but as a matter of economics it is generally not feasible).
32 Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, Title IV, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232-54 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
" See, e.g, Angela Bronner Helm, Monis Brown College "Victriously Emerges"from Banlaptcy,
NEWSONE (Mar. 28, 2015), https://newsone.com/3102559/morris-brown-college-emerges-from-
bankruptcy/ [https.//perma.cc/WB6V-EUPZ] (describing Morris Brown's "victorious" emergence from
chapter 11 with a class of approximately twenty students); Mike Morris, Monis Brown Trustee: College
Emerging from Bankruptcy, AJC.coM (Mar. 27, 2015, 12:27 PM),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/morris-brown-trustee-college-emerging-from-bankrup/nkgbx/
[https-//perma.cc/Y6YV-JKA8]; see also Bruckner, Comment, supra note 29 (suggesting that many
IHEs depend on Title IV funding and cannot survive if they file for bankruptcy).
' See infra notes 192-193 and accompanying text, see also Phyllis Maguire, Allegheny's Failure
Sends Shock Waves Through Academia, ACP-ASIM OBSERVER, Dec. 1998, [https-//perma.cc/98SE-
6LQY] (noting that the Allegheny University of the Health Sciences was part of the larger
reorganization of AHERF). Allegheny's reorganization was made possible because of a custom-
designed carve-out from 20 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4)(A).
" Matthew Bruckner, In voluntay Collegiate "Do Not Resuscitate" Orders, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept.
14, 2016), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/09/in-an-earlier-post-i-sought-to-
analogize-enron-collapse-to-the-recent-failure-of-itt-tech-a-for-profit-chain-of-colleges-i.html
[https://perma.cc/WU4F-3AVL]; see also Bruckner, supra note 25, at 698 (noting IHEs that file
bankruptcy face "an effective death sentence").
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not afforded an opportunity to use the tools available in bankruptcy
reorganization.16 This is a mistake. Bankruptcy's broadly available reorganization
provisions were designed to increase social welfare by allowing distressed
enterprises to return to viability despite their past mistakes. 11 Bankruptcy
reorganization cannot resuscitate every struggling IHE, but every IHE ought to
have the opportunity to reorganize."
To help illustrate why IHEs should be allowed to reorganize, this Article
compares the treatment of IHEs to that of healthcare enterprises." Unlike IHEs,
healthcare enterprises do not lose access to Medicare or Medicaid when they file
bankruptcy, and are sometimes successfully reorganized in bankruptcy
proceedings.4 As a result, they could serve as a model for fixing the issues that
plague some struggling IHEs. Although the analogy between higher education and
healthcare is imperfect, there are some "striking" parallels between the two
industries.4' Both industries involve an unusual mix of for-profit, private nonprofit,
and public enterprises.42 Both industries are under tremendous strain, with many
36 Cf 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012 & Supp. IV 2012) (listing entities that are per se ineligible to be a
debtor, including among others, railroads, certain types of insurance companies, and banks). But many
entities that are excepted from bankruptcy have recourse to a standalone reorganization provision. For
example, bank holding companies are typically reorganized through a FDIC receivership. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1819 (2012). However, some enterprises are excluded on public policy grounds. For example,
marijuana businesses have generally been unable to reorganize in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Vivian Cheng,
Medical Majuana Dispensaries in Chapter 11 Banlauptcy, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 105 (2013).
* Cf Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Effciency Fallacy, 2013 BYU L. REV. 759, 766 (2013)
(suggesting that chapter 11 was intended to contribute to an overall increase in social welfare).
" Perhaps it cannot even work to resuscitate most IHEs. But that is generally thought to be the
case with business bankruptcies as well. Most businesses that file for chapter 11 do not successfully
reorganize. See Elizabeth Warren &Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success ofChapter 11:A Challenge
to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 606, 614-15, 617 (2009) (arguing that chapter 11 quickly sorts
the likely-to-successfully-reorganize enterprises from the majority that are "dead on arrival"); see aso
Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt., 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 143 (2005)
(noting that the Bankruptcy Code "was designed to provide 'bankrupt businesses another opportunity to
succeed."') (footnote omitted).
31 My previous article, Bankrupting Higher Education, similarly argued that IHEs should be
allowed to reorganize in bankruptcy. See Bruckner, supra note 25.
' See David A. Samole et al., Health Care Bankruptcy:A Pimer ofa Provider's Chapter 11 Case
A.BA HEALTH ESOURCE, June 2017,
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba-health-esource/2016-2017/june2Ol7/bankruptcy.html
[https://perma.cc/9T4Z-J59M].
41 Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 Sw.
U.L. REV. 501, 508-09 (2000) (noting that the federal government's involvement in both industries
"was born under defense measure auspices, expanded under the policies of the Great Society in the
1960's, and saw rapid escalation of expenses as increasing numbers of Americans took advantage of
government programs in the latter twentieth century.") (footnotes omitted). There are also clear
differences, including the degree of federal oversight. See, e.g., infra notes 248, 251, and 253-256 and
accompanying text.
42 hiS rmix of provider types exists in few other industries. See Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols,
What Do Nonprofits Maximize? Nonprofit Hospital Service Provision and Market Ownership Mix 6
(Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13246, 2007),
zo7-=o8 229
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hospitals, nursing homes, and IHEs expected to shut down in coming years.' But,
the most important parallel is that the federal government is the dominant source
of financing in both industries, providing more than one trillion dollars annually for
healthcare and tens of billions annually for higher education." Yet, IHEs cannot
reorganize in bankruptcy, and healthcare enterprises, like almost every other type of
entity, may.45
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. In the next section, this Article
discusses the financial strain experienced by both the higher education and
healthcare industries and the reasons for that strain. It also explains the tools
available in bankruptcy that may help resolve these types of financial issues. Finally,
it offers Auburn as an example of how a healthcare enterprise used these tools to
reorganize in bankruptcy. This example also illustrates how bankruptcy
reorganization, if it were available, could benefit some IHEs. Section two provides
an overview of the federal government's involvement in both the higher education
and healthcare industries vis-1-vis Title IV of the HEA and Medicare. Section
three addresses the sole reason given for the disparate treatment of higher
education and healthcare enterprises in bankruptcy-that it is necessary to prevent
fraud and abuse---and provides three arguments why preventing IHEs from
reorganizing in bankruptcy fails to achieve this goal. This section also addresses
two possible counter-arguments, but argues that, on balance, precluding IHEs
http-//www.nber.org/papers/wl3246.pdf [https-//perma.cc/M5TW-76SS] ("[S]ome industries, such as
health and education, support government [public, nonprofit], for-profit, and nonprofit [private,
nonprofit] production, while other[] industries exhibit only one or two types of producers.").
4 See infra Sections IA-B; see also Bruckner, supra note 25 (discussing financial distress in the
higher education sector).
'In 2014, the federal government spent over $1 trillion on medical services provided through
Medicare and Medicaid. See Samuel Maizel et al., Corporate Bankruptcy Panel: The Healthcare
Industry Post-Affordable Care Act: A Banlauptcy Perspective, 31 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 257
(2015). For the median hospital, federal funding accounts for approximately forty-four percent of its
revenue. See infra note 211 and accompanying text. Estimates vary on how much the federal
government spends each year on higher education, but one 2015 estimate pegged federal higher
education spending at $132.5 billion. See Chris Edwards & Neal McCluskey, 11gher Education
Subsidies, DOWNSIZING FED. GOVr (Nov. 1, 2015),
http//www.downsizinggovernment.org/education/higher-education-subsidies [httpsi//perma.cc/7GSB-
XYR9] (citing U.S. GOVT PUBL'G OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2016: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES OF
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT thl29-1 (2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdasys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-
PER/pdf/BUDGET-2016-PER.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD3J-HBEP]. See Kellie Woodhouse, Impact
of Pel Surge, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 12, 2015),
https-//www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/12/study-us-higher-education-receives-more-federal-
state-governments [https://perma.cc/24Y6-MJ8T] (noting that state governments contributed
approximately $73 billion). Most other estimates are substantially lower. See infra note 19.
4 See Matthew Bruckner, My Can't Colleges Declare Bankruptc? HBCUs Would Beneft
Greatly from Chapter 11 Reorganization, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:19 PM),
http-//www.nydailynews.com/opinion/colleges-declare-bankruptcy-article-1.3013855
[https://perma.cc/R6HV-TJSP].
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from reorganizing condemns some IHEs to an unnecessary demise and the law
should be changed.46
I. FINANCIAL STRAIN AND BANKuuvrcY's TOOLS
The healthcare and higher education sectors are both experiencing fmancial
strain.47 ThiS section explores the reasons for that strain, which normally arises
because of a mismatch between revenue and expenses. Section A reviews the
available evidence, which suggests this mismatch exists in the higher education
sector because of the sector's predominant staffing model, physical plant costs, and
lower than expected revenue due to increased competition for students and
decreased state support.49 Section B reviews the evidence available in the healthcare
sector, which suggests that mandates to implement expensive new technologies,
rising drug costs, and declining state and federal support have caused financial
strain in the sector. so Finally, Section C highlights several tools available in
bankruptcy reorganization proceeding, explains how Auburn successfully used these
tools to execute its financial turn-around, and suggests how some IHEs could also
use them for the same purposes.
A. HigherEducation's "Looming Cisis"n
Many American IHEs are either financially troubled52 or headed toward
financial troubles." For example, Moody's Investors Service-the bond credit
' This Article seeks to avoid making normative claims about which IHEs deserve to be saved and
limits itself to making the normative argument that all IHEs should have the opportunity to reorganize.
4 '[T]he current environment puts financial stress on many providers, increasing the potential for
restructurings and bankruptcies" in the healthcare sector. David Deaton et al., Distressed Healthcare:
Signficant Considerations for Buyers, Sellers, and Lenders Arising from the Intersection of Healthcare
and Bankruptcy Laws, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 4 (2010); see abo Bruckner, supra note 25, 700-
03 (discussing financial distress in the higher education sector).
48 Of course, not every closed higher education or healthcare enterprise fits the molds described
herein as there are always idiosyncratic reasons why particular institutions experience financial distress.
4 Expenses for higher education enterprises tend to include "employee salaries, costs of instruction,
advertising costs, facility costs, capital expenditures, and general overhead and administrative costs." See
Decl. of Sean Harding in Support of the Debtors' Chapter 11 Petitions and Requests for First Day
Relief at 11-12, Inre FCC Holdings, Inc., No. 14-11987 (Bankr. D. Del Aug. 26, 2014) (describing
the major expenses of Anthem College, a now-defunct for-profit higher education business).
50 See infra notes 103-110 and accompanying text.
s See Victor Gold, Reducing the Cost of Legal Education: The Profession Hangs Together or
Hangs Separately, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 497, 497-505 (2016). This section borrows heavily from my
previous article. See Bruckner, supra note 25, at 700-05.
52 This is the growing consensus. See, e.g., Dawn Lyken-Segosebe & Justin Cole Shepherd,
Learning from Closed Institutions: Indicators of Risk for Small Pivate Colleges and Universities,
TENN. INDEP. COLLS. & UNIVS. ASS'N. (July 2013),
httpf//www.ticua.org/public-policy/sm-files/Learning%20from%20Closed%20Institutions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HBT7-MS74]; see also Pamela J. Bettis et al., Faculty in a Liminal Landscape: A
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rating arm of Moody's Corporation-has recently issued a series of reports
highlighting trouble in the higher education sector. One recent report noted that
revenue growth (predominantly tuition) at the majority of small colleges is not
keeping pace with inflation.54 With a weakened financial position, some IHEs-
particularly small, nonprofit colleges-are expected to be forced to dose or merge.5 5
As it is, almost 100 IHEs, operating at more than 700 campuses, ceased ucating
students in 2015-16.56 And this may only be the beginning. Most higher education
experts agree that the higher education industry is in trouble, and few college and
Case Study of a College Reorganization, 11 J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 47, 49-51
(2005) (discussing the "current cris[i]s" in higher education); Stuart M. Butler, The Cominglhgher-Ed
Revolution, 10 NAT'L AFF. 22, 22 (2012), https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-
coming-higher-ed-revolution [https://perma.cc/AS3M-7PY3] (describing the higher education
industry as being on the verge of "a transformative re-alignment"); Dennis Cariello, Allow Universities
to Restnucture Themselves Through Bankruptcy, HILL: CONG. BLOG (Jan. 22, 2015, 1:00 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/education/230282-allow-universities-to-restructure-themselves-
through-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/MWN5-L4NC] (suggesting that universities facing financial
pressure may need access to bankruptcy to survive).
s The financial pressure on the higher education industry is significant and appears to be growing.
See, e.g., Jamie Mason, Nonprofit Colleges Take up a New Subject Delault, DEAL (July 28, 2015, 9:41
AM), http://thedealnewsroom.tumblr.com/post/125256714447/nonprofit-colleges-take-up-a-new-
subject-default [https://perma.cc/3Q3X-YN38] (quoting "a senior managing director at crisis
management firm Conway MacKenzie Inc.," who predicted that "more defaults [should be expected] in
the next five years"); see abo Jeff Denneen & Tom Dretler, The Financially Sustainable University,
BAIN & CO. (July 6, 2012),
http://www.bain.com/Images/BAIN BRIEF_Thejfinanciallysustainableuniversity.pdf
[https*//perma.cc/ZGV5-KCV4]; Aaron Lacey, Why Colleges in Bankruptcy Should Have Access to
Federal Financial Aid, THOMPSON COBURN: REGUCATION BLOG (Oct. 7, 2014),
http-//www.thompsoncoburn.com/news-and-information/regucation/blog/14-10-07/why-colleges-in-
bankruptcy-should-have-access-to-federal-financial-aid~aspx [https://perma.cc/8XWQ-Y8L4];
Norberg, supra note 20, at 385 & nn.1-6 (collecting sources of media coverage about IHE's financial
struggles and failures).
5 DENNIS GEPHARDT, MOODY'S INV'RS SERV., U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION: SMALL COLLEGE
CLOSURES POISED TO INCREASE 1-5 (Sept. 25, 2015),
http://www.chronide.com/items/biz/pdflSmall%20College%20Closures%2Poised%20to%20lncrease%
5B6%5D.pdf [https-//perma.cc/N5HQ-27QD] (defining small, private nonprofit colleges as those with
FY2014 operating revenue below $100 million, and public colleges, as those with operating revenue
below $200 million); see also Frank H. Wu, The End(s) ofLegal Education, 66 J. OF LEGAL ED. 18,
19 (2016).
ss GEPHARDT, supra note 54, at 1-2.
56 U.S. Govr ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., Education Should Address Oversight and
Communication Gaps in Its Monitoring of the Financial Condition of School (Aug. 2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686709.pdf, see also Michael B. Goldstein & Jay Indyke, Bankruptcy
Benefits, TRUSTEESHIP MAGAZINE, SeptJOct. 2016,
www.agb.org/trusteeship/2016/septemberoctober/bankruptcy-benefits (noting that 162 independent
colleges have closed since 2000); Kate Smith, Here's What Happens to Endowments When Colleges
Close, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2017), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-
06/orphan-endowments-of-dead-schools-bedevil-states-across-america (c ting figures from the U.S.
Department of Education); Doug Lederman, The Culling oflhgher Ed Begins, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(July 19, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/07/19/number-colleges-and-universities-
drops-sharply-amid-economic-turmoil [https://perma.cc/RKZ2-9PXR]/
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university business officers are "confident in the sustainability of their business
model" over the next five-to-ten years.57
As is common with distressed entities, many IHEs are likely to encounter
financial trouble because their expenses are rising faster than their revenue.58 An
IHE's failure to increase revenue in line with its projections and difficulty
controlling expenses are both important determinants of its financial health.
Expense increases have multiple drivers. One of the largest expenses for IHEs is
personnel.s" Personnel expenses, including benefits, are estimated to represent
approximately three quarters of an IHE's operating budget, and are rapidly rising.'
Another substantial expense for IHEs is the purchase and maintenance of its
physical facilities." Finally, accreditation standards and other regulatory burdens,
57 "According to the latest poll of college and university chief financial officers (CFOs) by Inside
Higher Edand Gallup, fewer than a quarter are strongly confident in the sustainability of their business
model for the next five years. Even fewer--only [thirteen] percent of the 438 CFOs who responded--
are strongly confident in their model over the next [ten] years." Mark Toner, The Ighly Endangered
h~her Education Business Model (and How to ir It), AM. COUNCIL ON EDUc. (June 12, 2015),
www.acenet.edu/the-presidency/columns-and-features/Pages/The-Highly-Endangered-Higher-
Education-Business-ModeLaspx [https://perma.cc/8LKS-2NV7]; see also Gold, supra note 51, at 499-
505 (discussing the factors that have "essentially mandated what was an unsustainable business plan" for
law schools); Wu, supra note 54, at 19-20.
ss Mason, supra note 53 (describing several high-risk colleges and the reasons why they may
default).
' See Rick Bales, On the Cost ofLegal Education, LAw DEANS ON LEGAL EDUC. BLOG (Feb.
14, 2016), http/lawprofessors.typepad.com/law-deans/2016/02/on-the-cost-of-legal-education.html
[https://perma.cc/W4FD-R66N] (discussing law school faculty and staff salaries).
6 ROBERT C. DIcKESON, A NAT'L DIALOGUE: THE SEC'Y OF EDUc.'S COMM'N ON THE
FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUc., ISSUE PAPER- FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT COLLEGE
COSTS 1 (2006), http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/hiedfuture/reports/dickeson2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4UV-7X7E]; see also Gold, supra note 51, at 500-01 (discussing the importance of
investing in faculty in legal education); Wu, supra note 54, at 20 ("law school spending is primarily on
payroll").
6 These facilities often lack a clear alternate use, stymieing attempts to quickly reduce an IHE's
overhead expenses by repurposing these buildings. See Gold, supra note 51 at 500, 505 (describing the
two primary expenses of law schools as tenured faculty salaries, and buildings without a dear alternative
use). For example, when St. Paul closed down, HHS proposed housing hundreds of "undocumented
and unaccompanied children" in the former college's facilities, which is a somewhat unique repurposing
plan. See Dutton & St. George, supra note 19. Although unlikely to be a major cost center, numerous
politicians have pointed out that IHEs are busily installing lazy rivers and climbing walls in a bid to
attract students. See, e.g., Kellie Woodhouse, Lazy Rivers and StudentDebt, INSIDE HIGHER ED (une
15, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/15/are-lazy-rivers-and-climbing-walls-
driving-cost-college [https://perma.cc/SJ5U-K725] (quoting recent speeches by Gov. Chris Christie
and Sen. Elizabeth Warren, both knocking colleges for, in Christie's words, being "'drunk on cash and
embarking on crazy spending binges,' including the building of amenities like climbing walls."). These
seemingly frivolous amenities may be a rational response to attract students who are opting out of the
traditional college experience. See Scott Jaschik, Food Fight, INSIDE HIGHER ED (uly 18, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/07/18/malcolm-gladwell-sets-debate-over-whether-good-
campus-food-prevents-more-aid-low [https://perma.cc/5PWC-LX3Z] (noting evidence that fancy
amenities can drive enrollment growth, at least at schools with a highly competitive admissions process.)
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though often aimed at making education better, can create upward pressure on
costs.62
IHEs are not generally considered to be "financially nimble institutions."' They
are also rarely "managed with efficiency as the[ir] primary [goal].6 As a result,
even slowly accreting problems can cripple an IHEs, and problems in the higher
education sector have been accumulating recently. In particular, revenue growth at
colleges has been stagnant.65
Revenue growth has been stagnant at many IHEs because of, among other
things: (i) growing competition for students," (ii) declining state revenues devoted
to higher education,67 and (iii) IHEs approaching the maximum rates of tuition
that they can charge." Yet IHEs may have budgeted based on anticipated growth
But, if these bets do not pay off, IHEs will have incurred debt without sufficient revenue to satisfy those
debt burdens.
' Gold, supra note 51, at 506 (citing BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 173-77
(2012)); see id. at 501, 506 (discussing mandates that law schools add more clinical education, which
tends to be more expensive than other types of legal education); see also DICKESON, supra note 60, at 2
(noting that IHEs bear "significant expenses in administering federal financial aid," among other
things); Bales, supra note 59.
' See Gold, supra note 51, at 507 (discussing law schools).
6 See also DICKESON, supra note 60, at 2.
65 GEPHARDT, supra note 54, at 1-3 (noting that revenue growth (predominantly tuition) at most
small colleges is not keeping pace with inflation).
* See John W. Schoen, Why Does a College Degree Cost So Much?, CNBC (June 16, 2015),
http-//www.cnbc.com/2015/06/16/why-college-costs-are-so-high-and-rising.html
[https://perma.cc/4MML-ZGN3] (noting that enrollment at IHEs hit its peak in 2011, adding to the
competition for students among schools). Competition is particularly stiff for IHEs with a particularized
mission, such as HBCUs and single gender institutions. See GEPHARDT, supra note 54 (noting that
competitive pressures are particularly acute for small colleges, which are losing market share to larger
colleges); see also Bettis et aL, supra note 52, at 49.
67 Bettis et al., supra note 52, at 49-50; Doug Webber, Fancy Dorms Aren't the Main Reason
Tuition Is Skyrocketing, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 13, 2016, 11-03 AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/fancy-dorms-arent-the-main-reason-tuition-is-skyrocketing/
[https*//perma.cc/SGA5-XW55]. (attributing three-quarters of the rise in tuition at public IHEs since
2000 to decreasing state support); see abo Butler, supra note 52, at 37 (noting states are enduring an
.ongoing fiscal disaster"). But see Preston Cooper, Pennies on the Dolart The Surprisingly Weak
Relationship Between State Subsidies and College Tuition, AM. ENTER. INST. 2-3, 14, 18 (June 7,
2017), http://www.aetorg/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Pennies-on-the-Dollar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YC8K-SY7H] (attributing only five percent of recent tuition growth at IHEs to cuts
in state subsidies).
18 See Michael Mitchell et aL, Funding Down, Tuition Up: State Cuts to higher Education
Threaten Quaity and Affordability at Publc Colleges, CTR. ON BUDGET &POL'Y PRIORITIES 16,16
fig.8 (Aug. 15, 2016), https//www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-19-16sfp.pdf
[https-//perma.cc/K55S-NAJC] ("[A]bsorbing additional [tuition] expenses has been difficult for many
families because their incomes have been stagnant or declining."); Butler, supra note 52, at 25 ("The
financing vision of traditional higher education, which assumes steadily rising tuition and heavily
indebted graduates, is increasingly at odds with the financial capacities of typical households."); seeAllie
Bidwell, The Rise in Tuition Is Slowing, But College Still Costs More, U.S.NEWS &WORLD REP.
(Oct. 24, 2013, 3:27 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/24/the-rise-in-tuition-is-
slowing-but-college-still-costs-more [http://perma.cc/8X64-CCLA] (noting that the pace of tuition
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in tuition revenue (through some combination of enrollment growth and tuition
hikes) or with the expectation that previous cuts to state aid for higher education
would be restored.69 These inaccurate projections threaten IHEs' financial stability,
particularly when they have borrowed heavily based on these projections.
Many IHEs are (or should be) concerned about their financial viability.o An
IHE's financial strength depends on its ability to generate revenue in excess of its
costs." Financially vulnerable IHEs tend to lack the ability to generate additional
revenue through, for example, increased alumni giving, major gifts, or future tuition
increases.72 For instance, an IHE may not be able to raise additional tuition
revenue if it already has an open enrollment policy" or if it already significantly
discounts its tuition to lure new students.74 Some IHEs are able to rely on their
endowment in lean years, but many IHEs only have a smalls and/or restricted
endowment.76 Moreover, although many states have reversed some of their earlier
increases has slowed recently); see abo GEPHARDT, supra note 54 (explaining the revenue and expense
pressures felt by small colleges); Mason, supra note 53 (noting that IHEs who budgeted based on the
assumption that they "had an everlasting ability to raise the tuition rate" could be in trouble).
" See Butler, supra note 52, at 25 (describing the "financing vision of traditional higher education"
as being increasingly implausible); Cariello, supra note 52 (noting enrollment declines of one million
students from 2012 to 2015); GEPHARDT, supra note 54, at 1 ("The smallest colleges have inefficient
cost structures with net tuition revenue funding only three-quarters of educational expenses.").
0 See Toner, supra note 57.
71 See id; Webber, supra note 67.
n See generally GEPHARDT, supra note 54 (explaining the revenue and expense pressures associated
with small colleges).
73 See Arthur Levine, Bradford College: Requiem for a College, NEw DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER
EDUC., Winter 2011, at 19, 19 (pointing out that IHEs that are "not selective in admissions.... are
more susceptible to declines in the college-aged population and economic downturns than others").
7 When the ratio of colleges to college-aged population gets smaller, it increases competition
among schools, which may respond through tuition discounting even though this will exacerbate their
operating deficits. See, e.g., Dan Filler, Philadelphia Law School Tuition Price War Escalates; Pices
Drop, FACULTY LOUNGE (Jan. 22, 2014, 3:56 PM),
http-//www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/01/philadelphia-law-school-tuition-price-war-escalates-prices-
drop.html [https://perma.cc/G8J3-ZQLR] (describing price wars in the Philadelphia law school
market); see abo Levine, supra note 73, at 19-20 (explaining that, in competition against comparable
institutions, IHEs offer tuition discounts with the hope of attracting students); Frank H. Wu, Is Ihgher
Education Headed Toward Disaster?, HUFF POST: THE BLOG (May 27, 2016, 1:29 PM),
http*//www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-h-wu/is-higher-education-heade b_10166996.html
[https://perma.cc/R8SN-TWR4]. IHEs have had some success in shifting their revenue streams from
public support to student tuition dollars. Tuition, as a percentage of total educational revenue, has
increased substantially over the last twenty-five years, rising from approximately twenty-three percent in
1989 to nearly fifty percent in 2015. Mitchell et al., supra note 68, at 15-16, 15 fig.7 ("Nearly every state
has shifted costs to students over the last 25 years."). But see Cooper, supra note 67, at 6-10, 13-18, 20
(finding an increase in "aggregate revenues from net tuition" from 2004 to 2015, but that the rise in
revenue from tuition was not necessarily attributable to a decrease in state subsidies).
75 Levine, supra note 73, at 19 ("Low-endowment colleges are highly enrollment dependent and
have little in the way of a safety net when interest rates or the stock market or giving declines."); id. at
23; GEPHARDT, supra note 54, at 5.
76 Restricted endowments create "serious operational repercussions" for IHEs because restrictions
prevent an enterprise from deploying its assets to critical areas, which can "precipitat[e] financial
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cuts to higher education funding recently, some states continue to decrease their
support of higher education?
IHEs may have relatively more success in cutting their expenses than increasing
their revenue.7 ' For example, IHEs have been trending toward staffing more of
their classes with less expensive adjunct and non-tenure track faculty in lieu of
more expensive tenure-track faculty.79 IHEs have also sought to save money by
decreasing faculty-to-student ratios, and by reducing student services, course or
program offerings, and campus amenities. ' For example, the University of
Wisconsin-Madison laid off or eliminated 400 staff and faculty and held faculty
salaries constant in response to large state funding cuts."
At least two types of IHEs are at greater risk than others of encountering
financial distress. Both typically lack a substantial endowment, and have had
enrollment issues. Some of the most vulnerable institutions are "[s]mall, private,
[nonprofit], liberal arts colleges" founded to counter race- and gender-based
discrimination. As racial and gender barriers have diminished, minorities and
women have been able to enroll in a wider array of colleges. Competition for
students has caused enrollment at some HBCUs and women's colleges to plunge,
forcing some to close and others to redefine their roles.' Approximately eighty-five
percent of women's colleges have closed, merged, or begun admitting men.84 While
not all of these changes are directly tied to financial strain, some surely are.
collapse." See Evelyn Brody, The Charity in Bankruptcy and Ghosts of Donors Past Preents and
Future, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 471, 528 (2005). Restricted endowments can also inhibit an IHE
from borrowing money. CE id. at 528-29 (discussing why narrowly held assets may lead to financial
collapse in the context of churches and other charities).
n Mitchell et al., supra note 68, at 7 & n.12, 8 fig.3 (reporting that twelve states continued to offer
less financial support to IHEs, with Illinois's 37.1% cut leading the list).
8 It is also possible that cost-cutting will only save money in the short-term, but will create long-
term competitive disadvantages because they reduce the quality and availability of an IHE's academic
offerings.
* Webber, supra note 67.
Mitchell et al., supra note 68, at 14-15.
s Id. at 14 & n.28.
* Barbara R. Hatton, Reinventing Black Colleges in Postethnic Anerica: The Case of Knoxville
College, NEw DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC., Winter 2011, at 49, 50; see aso GEPHARDT, supra
note 54 (discussing the financial struggles of small colleges generally).
' See Hatton, supra note 82, at 50-51, 53-56, 60-61; see also Bruckner, supra note 45. But see
Valerie Strauss, Enrollments Surge at HIstoricaLly Black Coleges Amid Rise in Racial Tensions,
WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2016), https//www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2016/09/11/enrollments-surge-at-historically-black-colleges-amid-rise-in-racial-tensions/
[https://perma.cc/YV6K-AMSR].
* KRISTEN A. RENN, WOMEN'S COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 37
(2014). Peak enrollment for women's colleges was in 1960, and eighty-five percent have redefined
themselves since that time. See id. (noting that women's colleges decreased from approximately 300 in
1960 to less than forty-four in 2014).
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For-profit IHEs, several of which have recently endured very public collapses,
also gace a high risk of encountering financial distress.ss In addition to lacking a
substantial endowment and generally having an open enrollment policy,86 for-profit
IHEs have recently received a great deal of unwanted attention from regulators and
the general public." Scrutiny has followed "mounting evidence of predatory
recruiting practices, low graduation rates, outsized student debt burdens, and poor
labor market outcomes."" In response to these concerns, Congress and President
Obama imposed obligations on for-profit IHEs that they have not generally
imposed on nonprofit institutions, such as the gainful employment rules" and the
90/10 rule." These additional burdens have increased volatility in the for-profit
education sector, causing several for-profit IHEs to collapse recently."
s See Matthew Bruckner, Enron & ITT Tech, PRAwFSBLAWG (Sept. 8, 2016, 9:48 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/09/enron-itt-tech.html [https://perma.cc/FJ85-
531T].
86 In contrast to nonprofit IHEs, however, for-profit IHEs may be able to raise money from
investors.
87 CHARLIE EATON, ET AL., DEBT & SOCIETY, BORROWING AGAINST THE FUTURE: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF FINANCING U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 4-8 (May 22, 2014),
http://debtandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/BorrowingAgainst-theFuture_052214.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7CL-LGKK]. There is some evidence that President Trump's administration will
reduce the regulatory burden on for-profit IHEs, including rolling back the gainful employment rules.
See Andrew Kreighbaum, De Vos Allows Career Programs to Delay Disclosure to Students, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (July 3, 2017), https-//www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/07/03/education-department-
announces-new-delays-gainful-employment [https*//perma.cc/ALK2-V35Z].
88 EATON ET AL., supra note 87, at 17-18. Many of the industry's problems seem traceable to the
reorientation of for-profit IHEs "toward a scale-based business model" that seeks to maximize investor
returns by increasing the number of tuition-paying students while minimizing marginal costs. See id. at
19-20 (detailing the transformations of Education Management Corporation and Grand Canyon-
University); see abo id. at 21 (noting that gross profit margins among the publicly traded for-profit
IHEs averaged approximately fifty-five percent, which is significantly higher than the average gross
margin for most major industries).
" See Chadwick Matlin, The Reform ofFor-Proft Colleges: Can They Give Up Their Predatory
Ways?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/the-reforn-
of-for-profit-colleges-can-they-give-up-their-predatory-ways/279850/ [https://perma.cc/T9MZ-
KWUF].
* The 90/10 rule appears to have been intended to ensure that a school was of sufficient quality that
students were willing to have at least some "skin in the game." Matthew Bruckner, Accessing Title IV
$5: 90/10 or 85/15... Does it Matter?, PRAwFSBLAWG (Sept. 22, 2016),
http-//prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/09/9010-8515-does-it-matter.html
[https://perma.cc/DV2W-WZ3 K]. If at least some students were willing to pay tuition out of pocket, it
supposedly indicated that they thought the school was a good value. Id Thus, the 90/10 rule could serve
as a proxy for institutional quality. Id.
However, because the law refers to [ten] percent of revenue rather than [ten] percent of
students, a school can have more than [ninety] percent aided students-complying with the
letter but not the spirit of the law-by charging more than the total federal aid that is
available. In other words, every student gets maximum federal aid but must pay [ten] percent
above that.
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There are reasons to believe that the financial strain on IHEs will worsen.92
Some have even argued that a "transformative re-alignment" is coming to higher
education." After all, IHEs, like other enterprises, can only raise their prices so
high before students refuse to purchase their services, and evidence suggests that
IHEs may be reaching that threshold.9' Similarly, IHEs can only trim their
expenses so much before they begin to negatively affect the quality of the service
they provide.95 As a result, a number of commentators have suggested that we
should expect continued distress in the higher education sector, with some
institutions closing or merging.9'
B. Strain in the Healthcare Sector
In every decade since the 1930s, the U.S. has lost between eleven to twenty
percent of its urban hospitals." Hospital closings have followed a "predictable and
consistent" pattern with larger and teaching hospitals more likely to remain open,
and hospitals in black neighborhoods or those that serve greater numbers of
minority and Medicaid patients, more likely to dose." As in higher education,
ROBERT SHIREMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, PERILS IN THE PROVISION OF TRUST GOODS:
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN HIGHER EDUCATION 17 (May 2014),
https-//www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ConsumerProtection.pdf
[httpsi/perma.cc/M6PY-HPWB]. Moreover, it is not dear that students are well-positioned to
evaluate an IHE's institutional competency.
9 Joseph H. Smolinsky, For-Proft Education Institutions Face a Volatile and Uncertain Future,
WEIL: BANKR. BLOG (Dec. 7, 2015), https://business-fnance-restructuring.weitcom/contributors-
corner/for-profit-education-institutions-face-a-volatile-and-uncertain-future/ [https://perma.cc/KQP8-
PYYJ] (discussing for-profit IHEs). But see Kreighbaum, supra note 87.
' See generally Butler, supra note 52 (discussing the volatility of the higher education industry's
current path); GEPHARDT, supra note 54 (discussing increasing financial pressures on small colleges).
' Butler, supra note 52, at 22-23; see abo Doug Lederman, Clay Christensen, Doubling Down,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-
learning/article/2017/04/28/clay-christensen-sticks-predictions-massive-college-closures (reporting on
Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen's view that "[h]alf of the colleges and
universities in the United States are in danger of bankruptcy" over the next 10-15 years).
94 See supra note 68 and accompanying text- see abo Butler supra note 52, at 25-26 (noting that the
higher education industry is "edg[ing] toward a pricing tipping point"). Families may be unable to pay
higher tuition in the future as, since 1973, tuition at public IHEs has already "increased by 274 percent
while median household income has grown by only [seven] percent." See Mitchell et aL, supra note 68,
at 16.
s See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
* See Lederman, supra note 55; see also GEPHARDT, supra note 54, at 1-2.
* See, e.g., Alan Sager, Hospital Closings--Causes, Consequences, and Responses, BOSTON
OCCUPIER at 1 (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.bu~edu/sph/files/2010/10/Alan-Sager-The-Meaning-of-
Hosp-Closings-Occupier.pdf [https-//perma.cc/E8T2-BV8K]; see also Neil A. Halpern & Stephen M.
Pastores, Critical Care Medicine in the United States 2000-2005: An Analsis of Bed Numbers,
Occupancy Rates, Payer Mix, and Costs, 38 CRITICAL CARE MED. 65, 66 (2010) (finding that 20.6
percent of acute care hospitals closed between 2000 and 2005).
9 Sager, supra note 97, at 1.
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institutions that have historically served the neediest members of our society are at
the greatest risk of dosing.9
Healthcare enterprises, like IHEs, are being squeezed on both sides of their
balance sheets. A 2013 survey of nonprofit hospitals found that their "median
expenses grew faster than median revenue, for the second year in a row, while both
median operating margins and operating cash flow margins dropped."" In other
words, these hospitals are struggling financially.
On the expense side of the ledger, hospitals are spending more caring for
patients.10' Although granular data is hard to come by,102 one major driver of the
increased cost of patient care appears to be advanced technology,' such as the
mandate that healthcare providers become "meaningful use[rs]" of electronic
medical records.s" Additional cost-drivers include drugs, with the average monthly
price for certain cancer drugs having nearly sextupled from 2000 to 2014.05
9 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
" 1Hospital Hit a Revenue Crunch, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Apr. 25, 2014),
http-//www.healthcarefnancenews.com/news/hospitals-hit-revenue-crunch [https://perma.cc/WDA2-
W8Z4] ("Annual expenses grew at a rate of 4.6 percent last year, half a percent more than revenue,
which increased at a median rate of 4.1 percent, while median operating margins hit a three year low of
2.2 percent, and median operating cash flow margins fell to 9.3 percent, from 9.5 percent the previous
two years.").
"0. See Vivian Ho et al., Why Are Hospital Pices Rising?, HEALTH MGMT., POL'Y &
INNOVATION, Sept. 2013, at 1, 7-8, http://hmpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/HMPI-Ho-Dugan-
Ku-Goto-Why-are-Hospital-Prices-Rising-revise.pdf [https-//perma.cc/K8WR-NJIJT] (studying
Texas hospitals and finding that "at least two-thirds of the price increase that occurred between 2000
and 2007 can be explained by the higher costs of caring for [privately insured] patients.")
102 A classic model of the major "cost-influencing variables" that determine the cost of providing
hospital care includes the "number of cases treated, length-of-stay, complexity of case-mix, intensity of
service, scope of services, amenity level, quality level, efficiency, input prices, investments in human and
plant resources, and teaching programs." See John L. Ashby, Jr., & Craig K. Lisk, Why Do Hospital
Costs Continue to Increase, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1992, at 134, 134,
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.11.2.134 [https://perma.cc/Z2DC-Y3C4] (citing
William L. Dowling, Prospective Reimbursement ofHospita, 11 INQUIRY 163,165-66 (1974)).
103 See Ho et al., supra note 101, at 4 (describing the rising cost of hospital care as likely reflecting
the "greater use of advanced technology in medical care"); see abo Snapshots: How Changes in Medical
Technology Affect Health Care Costs, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2007),
https://www.kfforg/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-how-changes-in-medical-technology-affect/
[https://perma.cc/NG3Z-5L7P].
1 See Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Program, CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/
[https://perma.cc/YE2F-47J6] (last updated Sept. 11, 2017); see also Walker Ray & Tim Norbeck,
Who's to Blame for Our Rising Healthcare Costs?, Opinion, FoRBES (Oct. 3, 2013, 7:30 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/physiciansfoundation/2013/10/03/whos-to-blame-for-our-rising-
healthcare-costs/#60bb43f75671 [https://perma.cc/D3P8-AUJJ] (noting the "consensus among
[healthcare] experts that technology is the most important driver of healthcare spending increases over
time").
"o See Stacie B. Dusetzina, Drug Picing Trends for OralAdministered Anticancer Medications
Reimbursed by Commercial Health Plans, 2000-2014, Research Letter, 2 JAMA ONCOLOGY 960,
960-61 (2016) (stating that the rate increased from approximately $1,869 per month in 2000 to
approximately $11,325 per month in 2014).
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Another possible driver of increased costs for hospitals are minimum patient-to-
staff ratios.'06
On the revenue side of the ledger, hospitals have been squeezed by changes to
Medicare reimbursements,"'0 holdbacks from the sequester, the rise of "value-based
purchasing" arrangements imposed by the Affordable Care Act (the "ACA"),'os
and cuts to Medicaid because of state budget constraints.'" In addition, many
"0 For example, in 2005, California imposed minimum patient-to-nurse ratios for hospitals, which
may have increased the cost of care. See John M. Welton, Mandatory Hospital Nurse to Patient
StaFwg Raios: Time to Take a Different Approach, ONLINE J. OF IssuES IN NURSING (Sept. 30,
2007),
http-/www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/Tableo
fContents/Volumel22007/No3Sept07/MandatoryNursetoPatientRatios.html
[https//perma.cc/9KXW-YQUQ] (expressing concern that mandatory staffing ratios could result in
increased costs of care without any offsetting benefits).
107 The rate of growth in healthcare spending recently hit its lowest level since 1965, the year
Medicare was signed into law. Derek Thompson, How America Reduced Its Healthcare Spending by $2
Trilhon, ATLANTIC (Apr. 17, 2015), http//www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/
how-america-reduced-health-care-spending-by-2-trilion/390771/. This slowed rate of growth is the
result of many factors, including the Great Recession, the sequester, and pressure to constrain costs
created by the ACA. See, e.g., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMMN, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY (Mar. 2013), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-
source/reports/marl3_entirereport.pdPsfrsn=0 [hereinafter MEDPAC REPORT] (noting that
sequestration mandated a two percent payment reduction in most Medicare payments for services on or
after April 1, 2013). Although Medicare has long reimbursed many hospitals for less than their cost of
care, the sequester has exacerbated hospitals' revenue woes by mandating a two percent reduction in most
Medicare reimbursements. Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Impact of Automatic Budget
Enforcement Procedures Speci6ed in the Budget Control Act, (Sept. 12, 2011),
httpsL/www.cho.gov/publeation/42754 [https://perrna.cc/3HFL-B5WK].
"0 The ACA hurts hospital revenue in two ways. First, it has "permanently reduce[d] the Medicare
payments hospitals would otherwise receive" by imposing an approximately one percent per year
reduction in Medicare payments based on hypothetical productivity gains, whether or not hospitals
actually achieve these gains. Austin B. Frakt, The End of Hospital Cost Shifting and the Quest for
Hospital Productivity, 49 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 1, 1 (2013) (noting that this "productivity
adjustment" is "larger than historical, annual hospital productivity gains" meaning that hospitals will
need to become more productive than ever or find some alternative way to address slower growth in
Medicare payments.) Second, the ACA has also sped the shift toward value-based healthcare provision,
whereby healthcare enterprises are financially rewarded for their patients' positive healthcare outcomes
and penalized for their negative ones. This shift is intended to allow the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services ("CMS") to withhold Medicare payments based on the hospitals' quality of care, as
measured by patient health outcomes. In other words, CMS is attempting to shift from a fee-for-service
model to a pay-for-performance model. See alo Linking Qualty to Payment, MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/linking-quality-to-payment.html [https*//perma.cc/FYY9-
LJX9] (last visted Jan. 2, 2018); see also Memorandum from the Medicare Learning Network on
Mandatory Payment Reductions in the Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS) Program - "Sequestration" to
Health Care Professionals, Providers, and Suppliers (Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-
and-Education/Outreach/FFSProvPartProg/Downloads/2013-03-08-standalone.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FP2-ZM6P].
1o9 For example, Illinois cut Medicaid payments in 2012 by approximately $1.6 billion. Illinois
Medicaid Cuts: Legislatois Shave $1.6 Billon from Budget, HUFFPOST (May 26, 2012, 10:24 AM),
https*//www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/25/iIlinois-medicaid-cuts-le-n_1546668.html
[https://perma.cc/KPE6-HHBY].
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healthcare enterprises are suffering from "declining inpatient volumes" and the
corresponding revenue losses because margins are generally lower for outpatient
services.110 But, many hospitals and healthcare systems-like many IHEs-have
significant amounts of long-term debt that they may have incurred with the
expectation of stable (or even increasing) revenue."' As a result, many healthcare
enterprises are likely to encounter financial troubles or even "to edge toward
bankruptcy.""2 Tese changes help explain the troubled state of many healthcare
enterprises.
C Bankruptcy Reorganization's Advantages
Bankruptcy reorganization was intended to provide enterprises with an
opportunity for reinvention."' It is a generally applicable method of preserving
value for creditors, jobs for employees, and stability for communities."4 IHEs are
effectively precluded from reorganizing in bankruptcy because of financial
disincentives created by Congress. "' Yet, almost every other type of
enterprise-including healthcare enterprises-can use bankruptcy reorganization
for the benefit of its stakeholders.
This section discusses how IHEs would benefit from being permitted to
reorganize in bankruptcy and proceeds as follows. It explains how one healthcare
enterprise used the tools available in a chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization to
repay creditors, preserve enterprise value, retain jobs, and keep healthy the
community in which it is located. It then argues that some IHEs could reorganize
in bankruptcy to achieve similar results, and that all should be allowed to try.
Although many bankruptcy scholars disagree on the appropriate goals of a
bankruptcy system,"6 they generally agree that enterprises should be reorganized
when doing so is value-enhancing."7 Liquidating enterprises unnecessarily or too
no See Maizel et al, supra note 44, at 252. This is particularly true for certain types of diseases,
where there has been a "major shift toward less invasive treatments," and shorter hospital stays. Halpern
& Pastores, supra note 97, at 65.
". Cf Martin Kitchener et al., Smoke Without Fire: Nursing Facilty Closures in California, 1997-
2001, 41 INQUIRY 189, 189-90 (2004) (discussing the vulnerability of the U.S. nursing home industry
and findings from studies conducted in 2000 that determined that much of the industry was "heavily in
debt, understaffed, and losing money").
n2 See Burns et al., supr note 16, at 33-34; see aso Maizel et al, supra note 44, at 252.
113 See Bruckner, supra note 25, at 698-99 (suggesting that "chapter 11 nurtures [the] inner
phoenix" of distressed enterprises, "allowing them to rise from the flames as reorganized entities"); see
aso Miller & Waisman, supra note 38, at 143.
114 SeeJay Lawrence Westbrook, Commercial Law and the Publc Interest, PENN ST. J.L. & INTL
AFF. 445,455 (2015).
us See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
1 See Matthew Bruckner, The Virtue in Bankruptcy, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. 233, 237-38, 237 n.14
(2013).
17 See id. at 238 nn.16-17.
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quickly is thought to result in "fire sale" pricing. "' As a result, the default
assumption in the U.S. bankruptcy system is that bankruptcy's tools (and the
possibility of reorganization) should be available to all enterprises. It is
unsurprising, therefore, that healthcare organizations may use the bankruptcy
reorganization toolkit. But it is surprising that IHEs are strongly disincentivized
from doing so." Given the financial strain many are experiencing, bankruptcy
reorganization might be put to good use by IHEs, if only they could do so without
losing Title IV eligibility.120
Bankruptcy reorganization helps enterprises preserve value by granting access to
a variety of tools that are otherwise unavailable. These tools include, among other
things: (i) the automatic stay, which causes an immediate halt o nearly all creditor
collection activities;121 (ii) the ability to renegotiate, assume, assign, or reject certain
pre-bankruptcy contracts, including unexpired leases and collective bargaining
agreements; 122 and (iii) deleveraging an entity's balance sheet through the discharge
available at the confirmation of a bankruptcy case." Bankruptcy courts also have a
convening power that encourages creditors to renegotiate various obligations.1
24
" See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankiptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L.
REv. 1 (2007) (presenting "empirical evidence that reorganization" is more valuable than selling a
"distressed" company).
119 For a good discussion of how IHEs are effectively precluded from bankruptcy reorganization, see
Norberg, supra note 20. For an argument why this is inappropriate, see Bruckner, supra note 25; see also
supra text accompanying notes 31-33; infra text accompanying note 195.
12 See Bruckner, supra note 25, at 705-15, (discussing how IHEs might use the bankruptcy
reorganization toolkit to restructure); see also Bruckner, supra note 116, at 269-83 (discussing the
advantages of bankruptcy reorganization generally).
1 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(14H16) (providing exceptions to the
automatic stay for certain actions related to an IHE's licensing, accreditation, and Title IV eligibility);
Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankuptcies, 105
COLuM. L. REv. 2310, 2355 (2005) ("Thanks to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay and priority
rules, a small business can operate in bankruptcy free from creditor collection efforts and is barred from
servicing its debt until a plan of reorganization is confirmed.") (footnotes omitted); Mark G. Douglas,
Not-for-Proit Bankruptcies: Eleemosynary Corporations on the Brink, JONES DAY (Oct./Nov. 2004),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/3c832831-b679-4d36-ald5-
205b7ed23988/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fde325la-3eb8-42f5-aac8-
aaae8eca07f0/NYI_2168911 v1_NonprofitBRRArticleOctNov204.pdf (describing the automatic stay
as prohibiting "any creditor action against either the debtor or property of its estate to collect on a claim
that arose prior to the bankruptcy filing").
Arguably, public IHEs may not need the automatic stay because the so-called "arm of the state
doctrine" may provide them with sovereign immunity. Bruckner, supra note 25, at 706 & n.58.
Nevertheless, the automatic stay is probably still useful because the mechanism by which it works is well
understood, whereas the "arm of the state doctrine" would likely be litigated. Cf Steven L. Schwarcz, A
Minimalst Approach to State "Bankruptcy, "59 UCLA L. REV. 322, 326 & n.12 (2011) (mentioning
that quasi-sovereign entities, such as states, may not need the protection of the automatic stay).
m See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 1113-1114; see also Matthew Adam Bruckner, Terminating Tenure:
Rejecting Tenure Contracts in Bankruptcy, - AM. BANKR. L.J. _ (forthcoming, 2018) (on file with
author) (focusing on the treatment of tenure contrats by bankrupt IHEs).
m See id. §§ 944, 1129.
124 See id. § 4 362. 1102.
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Although bankruptcy reorganization is not particularly common in the
healthcare industry,2 s it may be useful to consider how at least one healthcare
enterprise has successfully used chapter 11. 126 Exploring how a healthcare
enterprise has used chapter 11 to reorganize can illustrate the advantages (and
limitations) of bankruptcy reorganization for IHEs. 1 27
On April 24, 2007, Auburn Memorial Hospital, located in upstate New York,
filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 in an ultimately successful attempt to
restructure its finances and operations.128 In the years leading up to its bankruptcy
filing, the hospital experienced serious financial problems, ultimately incurring
more than $20 million in unsecured debt, including $13.8 million owed to its
employees' pension system.2 9 Auburn's financial struggles precipitated a downward
spiral of underinvestment in its facilities, decreased patient volumes, and further
underinvestment. "o More specifically, Auburn's financial difficulties prevented
investments in its physical plant, such as operating and patient rooms, or in new
technologies, such as imaging scanners and electronic medical record systems.'
Without upgraded facilities and new technologies, Auburn could not attract
patients, leading to lower revenues and exacerbating its inability to invest in the
hospital. Eventually, the state attempted to shutter Auburn's maternity ward and
us See Maizel et al, supra note 44, at 265-74 (discussing the unique issues raised in healthcare
bankruptcy cases); see adso Gloria Bazzoli & Steven Andes, Consequences of Hospital Financial
Distress, 40 HosP. & HEALTH SERvS. ADMIN. 472, 480-82 (1995) (finding that only 1.2 percent of
hospitals in their study filed for bankruptcy protection between 1985 and 1990, and it is unclear whether
these hospitals liquidated or reorganized). It is unlikely that reorganization would be particularly
common in the higher education industry either. The point this Article seeks to make is not that
bankruptcy reorganization is the solution to the problems faced by higher education or that all IHEs
deserve to be saved. Instead, this Article merely means to suggest that IHEs have been unreasonably cut
off from a set of widely available legal tools, and that creditors, students, communities, employees, and
the IHEs themselves are worse off for it.
126 See infra notes 128-164 and accompanying text.
" This Article builds on a previous article that made the case for allowing IHEs to reorganize in
bankruptcy. See Bruckner, supra note 25; Norberg, supra note 20. As a result, this Article focuses on the
comparison to the healthcare industry instead of restating the arguments set forth in prior work.
us See Chapter 11 Voluntary Pet., In re Auburn Memorial Hospital, No. 07-31126 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007); Final Decrees and Order Closing Cases, In re Auburn Memorial Hospital,
No. 07-31126 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2010); David Shaw, Auburn Memorial Hospital Files for
Bankruptcy, SYRACUSE.COM (Apr. 24, 2007, 1:03 PM),
httpl//www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2007/04/auburnmemorialhospital-files.html
[https://perma.cc/57NZ-7TD7].
129 See Shaw, supra note 128; see alo Baran Aff., supra note 9, at 1 14-16, 39-43; Elliott-Engel,
supra note 16; Rapp, supra note 12 (writing that Auburn was "strapped with $25 million in unsecured
debt that it couldn't repay").
1" See Fields, supr note 15 ("Over the course of a decade, Auburn Memorial Hospital experienced
a prolonged period of financial contraction due to the departure of physicians, patients[,] and service
lines. Cash reserves were reduced, and the hospital found itself unable to invest. The hospital declared
bankruptcy in April 2007."); see alo Rapp, supra note 12.
13 Elliott-Engel, supra note 16.
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Auburn faced questions from its accrediting body.'32 A bankruptcy filing became
Auburn's best option to turn itself around.
Auburn successfully used the tools available in a bankruptcy reorganization to
execute a quick and dramatic tum-around, putting it at the "top of the pile for
success stories.""' In bankruptcy, Auburn successfully increased the number of
patients it treated, completed an important series of renovations, hired new staff,
increased hospital revenue, and recorded its most profitable year ever.'34 It used the
bankruptcy reorganization toolkit o: (i) reduce operating expenses, (ii) eliminate
unpayable pension obligations, (iii) restructure or discharge other unsecured debt,
and (iv) restructure operations to focus on financial viability and providing
appropriate care for the community.'3' Auburn also "streamlin[ed] operations,"
including reassigning personnel and improving its operational efficiency at core
tasks.'36 Finally, Auburn made targeted investments in much-needed areas, such as
updating its operating rooms' and creating an electronic medical record system.'
The results were "dramatic financial and clinical turnarounds."'3 9
Auburn's dramatic turnaround was only possible because of the bankruptcy
reorganization toolkit, which allowed the hospital to prevent its creditors from
asserting liens against (and possibly foreclosing on) its physical plant and to
discharge approximately eighty-six percent of its unsecured debt.40 In turn, the
bankruptcy discharge--and Auburn's ability to restructure its operations-may
have encouraged local foundations and New York State to contribute resources
toward necessary hospital renovations.141 In any case, it allowed the hospital to
spend millions of dollars on necessary capital improvements that would have
otherwise gone to repay legacy debts.142 Restructuring also left Auburn better
positioned for the future by allowing it to shift its focus from acute care toward
more in-demand medical services, such as "ambulatory, post-acute care and
community health operations."143
Bankruptcy tools allowed Auburn to remain a vibrant part of Cayuga County
and to invest in the county's future. Post-bankruptcy, Auburn continued to employ
132 See Rapp, supra note 12; see alo Fields, supra note 15.
13 Rapp, supra note 12 (quoting Syracuse University professor of hospital administration and
finances, Tom Dennison).
" Id. (writing that just three years after filing for bankruptcy, Auburn recorded its most profitable
year ever-$4.2 million on revenues of approximately $90.2 million).
13 See Baran Aff, supra note 9, at 1 19.
13 Fields, supra note 15.
s Elliott-Engel, supra note 16.
* Fields, supra note 15.
'40 See Rapp, supra note 12.
141 See id. (noting that Auburn received approximately $4.5 million in state support and $2.2
million from local foundations to fund a substantial portion of its $9 million renovation).
142 See Elliott-Engel, supra note 16 (noting that one of Auburn's primary goals in bankruptcy was
to reduce its debt service, "freeing up its cash flow for capital investment"); see alo Rapp, supra note 12.
143 House, supra note 14.
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hundreds of workers and contribute approximately $170 million annually to the
local economy.'" In short, Auburn ran out of cash, and, outside of bankruptcy,
could not fix its balance sheet. Comparably, many IHEs face similar issues and
would benefit from reorganizing in bankruptcy as Auburn did.
The automatic stay can give an entity that is trying to turn itself around enough
time to develop a plan to address its "substantial cash flow issues."'45 For example,
Auburn had failed to make more than thirteen million dollars in contributions to
the hospital's four employee pension funds.'" In response, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation "filed federal tax liens against the [h]ospital's real property,"
potentially jeopardizing the hospital's continued operation.'7 Auburn had also
apparently defaulted on certain obligations "under its Trust Indenture with U.S.
Bank."'48 As a result, the indenture trustee may have been able to declare an event
of default, triggering accelerated payment obligations.4 9 For a cash-strapped
organization that is already struggling to stay current on its obligations, accelerated
repayment obligations are often fatal. But the automatic stay allowed Auburn to
return its contracts to their pre-default position, thus decelerating its payment
obligations.'s
The automatic stay can also help IHEs address their cash flow issues by giving
them the breathing room needed to focus on restructuring their obligations instead
of lurching from crisis to crisis. For example, Paine College, a private nonprofit
HBCU in Augusta, Georgia has been wrestling with its finances recently."5' Paine
could benefit from the breathing room offered by the automatic stay to focus on
restructuring its operations. Moreover, if Paine were to default on any of its
obligations, the automatic stay would prevent its creditors from immediately
seizing their collateral.52 If individual creditors were able to seize their collateral, it
144 -d
145 Baran Aff., supra note 9, at 116. See 1 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). The automatic stay is of less value
to bankrupt IHEs than to many other types of entities because of three exceptions related to an IHE's
licensing, accreditation, and Title IV eligibility. See §§ 362(b)(14)-(16). Although these exceptions do
not necessarily need to be eliminated to allow IHEs to reorganize in bankruptcy, eliminating these
exceptions would aid IHEs if they sought to reorganize in bankruptcy.
1" Baran Aff., supra note 9, at 1 14.
1
4 7 id.
148 Id. at 1 15.
149 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (2012).
`s See Rapp, supra note 12.
's See Taylor Bingham, Paine College to Spend Another Year on Probation, WRDW.CoM aJune
11, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/Commission-expected-to-rule-on-Paine-
Colleges-accreditation-today-306966081.html [https://perma.cc/942P-JFKP] (describing Paine as
being on a probationary accreditation status because of issues related to its financial resources and
financial stability); see also Stacey Eidson, No Paine, No Gain, METROSPIRIT (Mar. 22, 2017),
http://metrospirit.com/no-paine-no-gain/ [https://perma.cc/R5ZZ-XVPT] (describing Paine's troubled
finances and its litigation with its accrediting body).
152 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
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could cause Paine to shut down unexpectedly to the likely detriment of other
creditors, students, faculty, staff, and the local community.
Auburn needed to negotiate new work rules with its employees. Most of
Auburn's employees were unionized and union work rules can often make it
difficult and costly to accomplish substantial operational changes.'s But, the
Bankruptcy Code allows an entity to reject, or refuse to perform, certain contracts,
including collective bargaining agreements.s4 If an enterprise is party to an
unfavorable contract, it can reject that contract, refuse performance, and redeploy
its assets in pursuit of more profitable endeavors."ss Even where debtors intend to
fidly perform their contractual obligations, debtors can use the threat of rejection to
negotiate a better deal going forward."s6 Auburn's management appeared to have
taken a firm position during negotiations, presumably because they knew the Code
empowered them to do so.1 s7
Although it turned out not to be necessary for Auburn, Auburn could also have
abrogated its collective bargaining agreements in chapter 11."s Like Auburn, IHEs
are likely to have hundreds, if not thousands, of contracts that they would prefer
not to perform under, both collective bargaining agreements and otherwise. IHEs
are likely party to scores of contracts and regularly contract with collective
bargaining units. For example, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst has
contracts with eleven bargaining units, setting forth employees' hours, wages, sick
time, and other employment conditions.s' If the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst needed to reorganize its operations, this tool would likely help it
renegotiate those agreements, allowing it to turn around its financial position.
Auburn also used chapter 11 to restructure both its operations and its finances.
In late 2006, the so-called Berger Commission issued a report on the state of New
York's hospitals and healthcare systems, including a recommendation that Auburn
dramatically reduce its number of hospital beds and entirely discontinue providing
" See Baran Aff., supra note 9, at ¶1 10, 39.
1S4 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012).
"s See 11 U.S.C. § 365. Outside of bankruptcy, breaching one's contractual obligations can be
more expensive than performing. By contrast, a bankrupt entity usually only pays its creditors a small
fraction of what they expected to receive at the time of contracting. See id; see aso George Triantis,
The Effects ofInsolvency and Bankruptcy on Contract Performance andAdjustment, 43 U. TORONTO
L. J. 679, 679 (1993); Bruckner, supra note 122.
156 Effectively 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) allows a debtor to renegotiate executory contracts and unexpired
leases, even though this power is not expressly granted by the Bankruptcy Code. See Triantis, supra
note 155 ("the adjustment of contracts is negotiated against the background of rules governing
breach.").
1 See Rapp, supra note 12 (noting that management "was unbending in negotiations" with certain
emergency room employees and offered terms that employees thought were "unfair and 'almost
laughable'").
" Elbott-Engel, supra note 16.
159 Human Resources: Bargaining Unit Employees, UMASSAMHERST,
https.//www.umass.edu/humres/bargaining-unit-employees [http://perma.cc/FR5E-LY9T] (last visited
Jan. 3, 2018).
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Ob-Gyn services.o Auburn used the chapter 11 process to reduce its acute care
hospital bed count from 191 to 99 but did not dose its maternity ward.'6' Instead,
it invested more than two million dollars in renovating its maternity ward.'62 In
addition, it modernized its operating and patient rooms and renovated its HVAC
systems.' Finally, Auburn used chapter 11 to discharge a lot of debt: Auburn paid
only fourteen cents to its unsecured creditors for every dollar it owed, making
possible many of the aforementioned renovations.'
IHEs are also likely to need to restructure their operations and finances in
response to changes in student demand. Bankruptcy tools like the ones Auburn
used, including the automatic stay and the discharge provisions in section 1141,
would likely be very useful. 6 s For example, in 2015 Education Management
Corporation, a for-profit education company, and other affiliated entities sought to
use the bankruptcy system to restructure approximately $1.5 billion of debt."6
Although "EDMC was effectively precluded from filing for bankruptcy because
doing so would have rendered EDMC ineligible for federal funding under Title IV
of the Higher Education Act of 1965, depriving it of 80% of its revenue," it dearly
thought it would benefit from bankruptcy reorganization.16 Similarly, if St. Paul
had been able to discharge a substantial portion of its debt, St. Augustine may have
acquired the college and helped preserve St. Paul's legacy.'6 8
It is also important to note what chapter 11 did not do for Auburn and would
not be able to do for IHEs. Chapter 11 could not increase Auburn's
reimbursements from Medicare. Nor could it force patients to pay Auburn for its
care. Similarly, bankruptcy cannot fix every problem faced by IHEs. It cannot force
governments to increase their support for higher education or force students to
choose certain IHEs. For example, Sweet Briar College's board of trustees was
ousted in 2015 after it sought to shut down the college amidst enrollment
problems, including a "rising discount rate (the percentage covered by institutional
"60 See Baran Aff, supra note 9, at 1 17.
161 See id. at 1 7 (noting that as of April 24, 2007, Auburn's "acute care division [was] licensed for
191 beds"); Rapp, supra note 12 (noting that following bankruptcy, Auburn operated a "99-bed
hospital"); see also id. ("[Auburn] staved off a state recommendation to shutter its maternity ward.").
162 Rapp, supra note 12.
163 Elliott-Engel, supra note 16.
164 Rapp, supra note 12 ("Creditors received an average of [fourteen] cents for every dollar they were
owed, and the hospital replaced its employees' pension fund with a government-guaranteed retirement
program."); see also supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
165 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1141(d)(1)(A) (2012). In the bankruptcy proceeding of a public IHE,
chapter 9's section 944 is likely to be the relevant provision.
'6 Jessica Lion, What Marblegate Can Teach Us About the Protections Available to Anority
Noteholders in an Out-of-Court Restructudng, WEiL: BANCR. BLOG (Aug. 12, 2015), http://business-
finance-restructuring.weil.com/case-overviews/what-education-management-can-teach-us-about-the-
protections-available-to-minority-noteholders-in-an-out-of-court-restructuring/
[https-//perma.cc/8JA7-JAKM].
167 See id.
'See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
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aid or discounts off sticker price that families pay), a declining yield (the percentage
of admitted applicants who enroll)[,] and the difficulty of recruiting applicants to a
rural women's liberal arts college."" While the school remains open after alumnae
"agreed to raise $12.5 million" and the Virginia attorney general agreed to allow the
college to use up to $16 million in previously restricted endowment funds,70
bankruptcy would not be able to resolve the college's enrollment problems.
In addition to its advantages for bankrupt entities, bankruptcy reorganization
also has many positive externalities. Bankruptcy can help preserve jobs when an
enterprise continues operating.' Additionally, by keeping an enterprise's doors
open, bankruptcy reorganization can prevent pension losses,72 and avoid knock-on
effects in bond markets.'73 In the healthcare context, avoiding the sudden and
unplanned dosing of facilities can save lives because "when hospitals die, people
die."'74 Although lives are not literally at stake when IHEs close, the economic lives
of students, faculty, staff, and communities often are.
Bankruptcy reorganization was designed to provide the aforementioned benefits
to any entity that may reorganize under its auspices. All the benefits reaped by
Auburn could also be reaped by IHEs, if only they were encouraged to file instead
of financially precluded from doing so. To understand why IHEs would also
benefit from bankruptcy reorganization, it is important to understand the two
industries. Thus, section two provides an overview of the higher education and
health care industries, emphasizing the similarities between these two industries to
highlight why their disparate treatment in bankruptcy is inappropriate, an
argument largely addressed in section three.7s
II. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION AND HEALTHCARE
The federal government is as important to the U.S. healthcare and higher
education industries as are the doctors and patients, professors and students. Each
year, the federal government spends hundreds of billions of dollars to increase
citizens' access to both higher education and healthcare. This section provides an
overview of both the federal student loan and grant programs (i.e. Title IV) and the
Medicare program to help explain the federal government's role in both industries
1" Scott Jaschik, Sweet Briar Survives, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 22, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/22/deal-will-save-sweet-briar-college
[https://perma.cc/ZF46-J3QW].170id
171 Bruckner, supra note 116, at 269-75 (discussing chapter 11's ability to preserve jobs).
'n See Burns et aL, supn note 16, at 36.
" See Bruckner, supra note 25, at 735-36; Burns et al., supra note 16, at 36.
174 See Maizel et al., supr note 44, at 257.
175 Despite the numerous differences between hospitals and IHEs, hospitals are a reasonable point
of comparison for IHEs for the reasons set forth in the text surrounding notes 39-43, supra. For a
summary of some of their differences and the reasons why the comparison may be inapt, see infra notes
248, 251, and 253-256 and accompanying text.
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and why it has chosen to play such a role. This background information will help
explain why it is perplexing that IHEs cannot reorganize in bankruptcy.
A. Title IVPrograrn Overview
Title IV of the HEA established the modern "foundation for federal student aid
in higher education.""' Although the federal government had long supported
higher education, "Title IV represented the first generally available aid program"
for college students.' One of the HEA's primary goals is to increase student access
to post-secondary education."' Prior to the HEA's enactment, only "a fraction of
the population" was able to attend college, a fraction that was primarily limited by
race, income, and gender."' Without federal subsidies, "it seems highly unlikely
that the nation's poor would have been able to capitalize on higher education
opportunities.""" The HEA is generally thought to have succeeded in "making
176 See Matthew A. McGuire, Subprime Education: For-Profit Colleges and the Problem with
Title IVFederal StudentAid, 62 DuKE L.J. 119, 119 (2012). Arguably, land grants represented the first
government involvement in the U.S. higher education system. See Patricia Somers &James M. Hollis,
Student Loan Discharge Through Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 457 (1996) (tracing
federal involvement in higher education to 1862 with the passage of the first Morrill Acts); see also
McGuire, supr, at 122. But the modern system appears to have begun in 1944 with the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944 (a.k.a. the G.I. Bill). See id. at 122-23. Then came the "emergency" National
Defense Education Act of 1958. See Michael Gleeson, Student Loan Debt and the Effects on the
Broader Economy 7-8 (Apr. 2016) (unpublished MA. capstone, Johns Hopkins University) (on file
with the Johns Hopkins University Library),
https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38646/Michael%2Gleeson.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TC3X-WT2N]; see also Bridget Terry Long, Supporting Access to igher
Education, in LEGACIES OF THE WAR ON POVERTY 93, 98-99 (Martha J. Bailey & Sheldon Danziger
eds., 2013) (describing the HEA and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 as "establish[ing] the
foundation of the federal financial aid system that exists today"). But see Sarah Molinero, Comment,
Reexamining the Examiners: The Need for Increased Government Regulation of Accreditation in
I-gher Education, 51 DuQ. L. REV. 833, 841 (2013) (identifying the National Youth Administration
as "the first federal program that assisted individual students in gaining access to institutions of higher
education").
177 Long, supra note 176, at 101 (quoting Angelica Cervantes et al., TG RESEARCH &
ANALYTICAL SERVS., Opening the Doors to Higher Education: Perspectives on the Higher Education
Act 40 Years Later 20 (Nov. 2005), https://www.tgslc.org/pdf/HEAHistory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7PS4-XS2C]).
17s The HEA's goal was to "mak[e] higher education more accessible" and it "has achieved its goal,"
with college enrollment increasing "from 10.5 million students in 1980 to 17.6 million students in
2009." Kathleen Negri, Note, Mortgaging the American Dream: The Aisplaced Role ofAccreditation
in the Federal Student Loan System, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1905, 1905 (2014). See id. at 1907 (stating
that, by signing the HEA into law, President Johnson "hop[ed] to reduce financial barriers and provide
equal access to higher education"); see also Somers & Hollis, supra note 176, at 458.
179 Long, supra note 176, at 94; see also id 96-97 (stating that, by 1960, most Americans had failed
to complete high school, let alone college, with financial concerns being a likely cause).
so Id. at 106.
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mass American higher education possible" by mitigating the income barrier's effect
on college attendance.'
There are numerous reasons why the federal government has sought to increase
college enrollment. Increasing college access is thought to increase the U.S.'s
international competitiveness, to correct market failures, and to eliminate
poverty.'82 Increased college enrollment is thought to benefit American society "by
creating a more qualified, higher-paid workforce, ultimately improving the quality
of life.""' Additionally, "[i]ndividuals with a college degree earn greater than a
million dollars more in their lifetime and have a lower unemployment rate than to
[sic] those with [only] a high school diploma.""
Federal efforts to promote college access through Title IV have not been cheap.
The federal government indirectly provides an enormous amount of money to
IHEs, including more than $76 billion in 2013, representing a slight majority of all
student aid.' Federal student aid takes a variety of forms, including well-known
programs such as Pell Grants,'8" Perkins, Grad (PLUS), and Stafford Loans."a
181 Id. at 93; see also id. at 106-07 (highlighting that enrollment rates increased "since the War on
Poverty," with just over half of students enrolling at an IHE immediately following high school in 1975,
but more than two-thirds enrolling in 2010).
182 See id, at 100-01; see also Jonathan D. Glater, The Unsupportable Cost of Vaable Picing of
Student Loans, 70 WASH. &LEE L. REv. 2137, 2168 (2013) (describing "lawmakers' determination to
promote and protect access to education generally, as an end in itself, on the basis of a broad conception
of what is in the national interest"); see aso id. (noting that members of Congress also wanted to
enhance and defend our "national defense and economic preeminence"); Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based
Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 527, 530 (2013) (describing the goals of funding higher
education as "increas[ing] the supply of skilled labor, promot[ing] economic and technological
development," and promoting social mobility); Reid K. Weisbord, Charitable Insolvency and Corporate
Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 305, 310 (2013) (suggesting that
"society is collectively better off when . . . young people are educated").
183 Negri, supra note 178, at 1913.
184 Gleeson, supra note 176, at 1.
185 Woodhouse, supra note 43; see aso THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, Federal and State
Funding of Higher Education: A Changing Landscape 1 (June 11, 2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/06/federal statefunding-higher-educationjfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5CCJ-SBG8] (noting that "[h]istorically, states . . . provided a [much] greater
amount of [financial] assistance to postsecondary institutions" relative to the federal government);
Negri, supra note 178, at 1909 ("[G]overnment loans dominate the student loan market."); cJ EATON
ET AL., supra note 87, at 1, 32 n.1 (calculating 2012 total U.S. higher education spending, including
interest spent on student loans, at $525 billion). But see Edwards & McCluskey, supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
18' See Somers & Hollis, supra note 176, at 459; see also Types ofAid: Grants and Scholarships,
FED. STUDENT AID, httpsi/studentaid~ed~gov/saltypes/grants-scholarships [https:/perma.cc/GD3J-
HBEP] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
1s7 See Somers & Hollis, supra note 176, at 459-60; see also Types ofAid: Loans, FED. STUDENT
AID, https-//studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans [https*//perma.cc/V3CS-GXEZ] (last visited Jan. 3,
2018). Stafford Loans are also referred to as Direct Subsidized or Unsubsidized Loans. See Types of
Aid: Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, FED. STUDENT AID,
https/studentaid.ed.gov/satypesloans/subsidized-unsubsidized [https/perma.cc/5P63-CJ7A].
Vol. 106250
Higher Ed "Do Not Resuscitate" Orders
Total student loan indebtedness now tops one trillion dollars,' almost all of it
backed by federal government guarantees."'
Title IV's programs are critically important to IHEs, as well as the students that
attend them. Students use Title IV grants and loans to defray the cost of attending
an institution of their choosing. ' Thus, although students are the direct
beneficiaries of Title IV programs, IHEs are indirectly supported by Title IV.' 9'
Some IHEs obtain nearly all of their revenue from Title IV.1 92
Without the ability to accept Title IV dollars, IHEs generally cannot survive.
For example, Corinthian Colleges shut down its operation in 2015-which
formerly consisted of more than ten thousand employees, "operating more than 100
campuses attended by 81,000 students"-because it could not withstand even "a
21-day hold on the company's access to federal student loan funding."'93 Similarly,
ITT Educational Services, Inc. ("ITT") "abruptly announced that it was
immediately closing all of its schools" after the U.S. Department of Education (the
"ED") banned any ITT campus "from enrolling new students that require[d]
..s See Mark Kantrowitz, Whly the Student Loan Cnsis Is Even Worse than People 7hink, TIME:
MONEY (Jan. 11, 2016), http-//time.com/money/4168510/why-student-loan-crisis-is-worse-than-
people-think Ehttps://perma.cc/8DCB-FF2C]; see abo Gleeson, supra note 176, at 2 (describing the
rise in the number of student loan borrowers and the amount they borrow as "staggering").
.' See Susan M. Dynarski, The RNC Wants to Make Student Loans Competitive Again. They
Never Were., BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (July 21, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-rnc-
wants-to-make-student-loans-competitive-again-they-never-were/ [https://perma.cc/JZ3L-C8W4]/
(discussing the federal government's long-standing, central role in the student loan market); see also
Roots, supra note 41, at 504-06 (discussing the evolution of "[b]orrowing under federal loan
programs"); Somers & Hollis, supra note 176, at 459-60.
'90 See McGuire, supra note 176, at 125; see also THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 185,
at 7 fig.6 (calling the federal government "the nation's largest student lender" because "it issued $103
billion in loans in 2013").
'91 See McGuire, supra note 176, at 125, 139-40; Long, supra note 176, at 101-02 (finding that the
federal approach to financing higher education has, generally, been to support lending directly to
individual students); see also THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 185, at 8 fig.7 (noting that
the federal government also "provided $31 billion in tax credits, deductions, . . . and exclusions" in 2013,
which are "similar to direct government spending").
192 McGuire, supra note 176, at 121 ("[F]ederal aid constitutes nearly all of the revenue of many of
the most prominent for-profit institutions."). Presumably, federal aid would constitute all of the revenue
of some for-profit IHEs if the government did not set a maximum limit of ninety percent federal
funding. See Michael Stratford, New Fodder for 90/10 Debate, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 13, 2014),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/13/more-profit-colleges-would-fail-9010-rule-if-
veterans-benefits-are-included-analysis [https://perma.cc/8EAN-9XGK] (finding that many for-profit
institutions exceed the 90/10 rule, "which prohibits for-profit colleges from deriving more than [ninety]
percent of their operating revenue from federal student aid money[,]" and that many more would exceed
the threshold if veteran education program dollars were included in the calculation); see also Bruckner,
supra note 90 (pointing out the loophole in the 90/10 rule for veterans' programs and the need to
address it).
... Stephanie Gleason, Corinthian Colleges Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, WALL ST.J. (May 4,
2015, 3:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/corinthian-colleges-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy-
1430746291 [https//perma.cc/G95N-6QXP].
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federal financial aid."194 In short, terminating access to Title IV finds is a death
sentence for most IHEs. As a result, Congress's decision to terminate an IHE's
access to Title IV if it files bankruptcy effectively eliminates most IHEs'
opportunity to be resuscitated in a bankruptcy reorganization.195
B. The Medicare Progran96
On July 30, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Medicare program
into law.'97 Medicare is a federal health insurance program for the elderly that
reimburses qualified healthcare enterprises for the care they provide to Medicare
program beneficiaries.!' The United States Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") administers the Medicare program through CMS."9 Although
the federal government's involvement with the American healthcare system
predates this program," Medicare's passage began a massive expansion of that
involvement.20 '
One of Medicare's primary goals is to increase access to healthcare for the
elderly?02 Prior to Medicare's enactment, elderly folks were particularly unlikely to
have insurance coverage "for the potentially catastrophic burdens of hospital and
doctors' bills." Some viewed the elderly population's lack of healthcare access as a
194 Bruckner, supra note 85.
195 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
196 The following material relates directly to hospitals, but, with some limited exceptions for
purposes of this Article's thesis, it relates to most other healthcare enterprises.
197 History, CMS.GOv, https//www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-information/History/
[https://perma.cc/3VYZ-HZC2] (last updated Sept. 14,2017).
198 
Nathaniel M. Lacktman & Keith C. Owens, Health Care Providers and the Automatic Stay- Is
Medicare Termination Different than Exclusion?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 1, 2006,
https*//www.abi.org/abi-journal/health-care-providers-and-the-automatic-stay-is-medicare-
termination-different-than [https://perma.cc/9U3H-P8BH].
19 Bobby Guy, Acquiring the Distressed Health Care Business, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb.
2014, at 40; About CMS, CMS.Gov, https-//www.cms.gov/About-CMS/About-CMS.html
[https://perma.cc/9V4C-E37U] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
2o For instance, the Kerr-Mills Act of 1960 provided federal funds to cover the care of the elderly.
See Rosemary A. Stevens, Health Care in the Earl* 1960s, 18 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv. 11, 12
(1996), https://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/HealthCareEarlyl960s.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ47-A9ZL].
2 American healthcare "was already a massive enterprise" in the early 1960s, with hospital
employment exceeding that of the steel, automobile, and railroad industries. See id., at 11 (citing H.M.
Somers & A.R. Somers, Doctors, Patients, and Health Insurance. The Organization and Financing of
Medical Care, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (1961)).
2' See Stevens, supra note 200, at 11-12, 14 (discussing the elderly's lack of health insurance at the
time Medicare was passed); see also In re Vitalsigns Homecare, Inc., 396 B.R. 232, 240 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2008) (noting that Medicare's fundamental goal is "providing health care to the elderly and
disabled while protecting the public fisc"). Medicare has also been described as bridging the gap between
Johnson's vision of a Great Society and the reality of America in the 1960s by using Medicare to
transform[] the elderly into paying consumers of hospital services." Stevens, supra note 200, at 14.
" Stevens, supra note 200, at 12; see also Louis Jacobson, Were the Early 1960s a Golden Age for
Health Care?, POLITIFACT (Jan. 20, 2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
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market failure justifying government intervention.20 In this regard, Medicare has
been a success. In 2015, Medicare served approximately 55 million beneficiaries
nationwide,205 and provided access to healthcare coverage for tens of millions more,
"many of whom who would otherwise have lacked access to any kind of health
care."a Just as the federal government finances higher education to improve access
to education, the federal government uses Medicare to improve access to
healthcare. In both cases, the government intervenes to provide funds that students
and patients otherwise lack to facilitate their access to education and healthcare
services respectively.207
Medicare has successfully expanded access to healthcare for the elderly," but
has done so at a tremendous cost. The federal government is the primary purchaser
of healthcare in the United States. 2  In 2016, the federal government spent
approximately $672.1 billion on Medicare coverage.2 10 Hospitals are heavily
dependent on Medicare revenue, with one survey finding that the median hospital
received nearly forty-four percent of its patient revenue from Medicaid alone.2 11
meter/article/2012/jan/20/was-early-1960s-golden-age-health-care/ [https/perma.cc/AM9B-XZZV]
(citing the 1963 "Survey of the Aged" conducted by the Social Security Administration that found
'eight out of [ten] elderly individuals[] 'assumed responsibility for their own costs without help from
government sources or private voluntary agencies'").
204 Stevens, supra note 200, at 14 (describing Medicare as a solution to the market's failure to
provide affordable medical care to the elderly).
20s Press Release, CMS, On Its 50th Anniversary, More than 55 Million Americans Covered by
Medicare (July 28, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-
releases/2015-Press-releases-items/2015-07-28.html [httpsi/perma.cc/L6ZM-P4ZC]
2" Medicare Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: A Regional Perspective: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 8 (1998) [hereinafter
Medicare Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Hearing| (prepared statement of Nancy-Ann Min DeParle,
Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration); see also id (highlighting that in 1998,
Medicare served "more than 39 million beneficiaries nationwide" and had "provided access to health
care coverage for almost 80 million Americans" over its thirty-two-year life).
207 The federal government also provides access to health care through Medicaid. See Access to
Care, MEDICAID.GOV, https//www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/access-to-care/index.html
[httpsi//perma.cc/8Z6W-YRC9] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
208 Jacobson, supra note 203 (explaining that prior to Medicare and Medicaid's enactment, "[m]any
people in the U.S.... had very limited access to medical care") (quoting Ronald Andersen, emeritus
professor of health services and sociology at UCLA School of Public Health).
2" Kerry Young, Federal Government Emerges as Top Health Buyer in New Analysis, WASH.
HEALTH POL'Y WK. REv. (The Commonwealth Fund, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 5, 2016,
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletters/washington-health-policy-in-
review/2016/dec/december-5-2016/federal-government-emerges-as-top-health-buyer
[https://perma.cc/972H-27M3].
210National Health Expenditures Fact Sheet, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-
data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html
[https://perma.cc/4G2N-N4RX] (last updated Dec. 6, 2017).
211 Hospital Ht a Revenue Cnmch, supra note 100 (surveying revenue sources of 203 nonprofit
hospitals and finding that "a median of 44.3 percent came from Medicare. . ., 12.9 percent came from
Medicaid, . . ., 32.1 percent came from commercial payers .. .[,] and 7.6 percent came from self-pay,
see also Hospital Finance: 101, CTR. FOR HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 2013),
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III. WHY IHEs SHOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDED FROM
BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION
This section has three purposes. Section A addresses Congress's sole
justification for precluding IHEs from using a widely available legal provision
designed to resuscitate financially troubled enterprises: the hope that it will deter or
prevent fraud and abuse.2 12 Section B offers three arguments why precluding IHEs
from bankruptcy reorganization is not (and never was) an appropriate solution to
this problem, including: (i) that bankruptcy reorganization is more likely to prevent
fraud than non-bankruptcy alternatives; (ii) that precluding voluntary bankruptcy
reorganizations but not comparable state and federal alternatives is peculiar; and
(iii) given the relative amounts of taxpayer dollars at risk, it is not sensible to allow
healthcare but not higher education enterprises to reorganize. Section C discusses
two counter-arguments. First, fraud may be more likely to occur in the higher
education sector than the healthcare sector. Second, healthcare enterprises erve
more vulnerable clients than IHEs, making reorganization more important for the
former. This section concludes that, on balance, the arguments for allowing IHEs
to reorganize in bankruptcy are more persuasive than the arguments against.
Therefore, IHEs should not be effectively precluded from reorganizing.
A. The Congressionaljustifcation for Denying JHEs Access to the Bankruptcy
Reorganizaion Toolkit
Congress has only offered one reason for denying economically struggling IHEs
access to bankruptcy reorganization, which is the perceived prevalence of fraud and
http://www.neohospitals.org/TheCenterForHealthAffairs/MediaCenter/NewsReleases/2013/April//m
edia/08FDE88949E24BA5BAE9650B6534A1DE.ashx [https*//perma.cc/6HAY-3PYL] (claiming
that, in 2010, 39.1 percent of hospital costs were paid by Medicare and 16.1 percent were paid by
Medicaid).
212 See Abuses in Federal Student Aid Programs: Hearngs Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investgations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong. 22 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings
Before Permanent Subcomm.] (statement of Kim Wherry, Counsel, Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations) (discussing her view that IHEs abuse the bankruptcy system); see also id. at 39-40
(statement of James B. Thomas, Jr., Inspector General, U.S. Department of Education) (describing the
Inspector General's investigation into "fraud, waste, and abuse" in federal student aid programs); cf 140
CONG. REC. 20,174-175 (1994) (Letter from James B. Thomas, Jr., Office of Inspector Gen., to Sen.
Claiborne Pell, Chairman, Subcomm. on Educ. & Humanities, S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res.
(June 24, 2014)) (calling it "abuse" when "schools set tuition prices that bear little or no relation to the
quality" of the program, future employment prospects[,] or likely future salaries of students); Qualty in
Hgher Education: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Educ., Arts, & Humanities of the S. Comm. on
Labor & Human Res., 99th Cong. 16-17 (1986) (statement of William J. Bennett, Secretary of
Education, U.S. Department of Education) (Institutions are defrauding students, and in many cases
they are ripping off the American public, when they admit individuals who are manifestly unprepared
for the work that will be required of them, or when they graduate students who cannot satisfy minimum
standards in their field of study.").
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abuse in the higher education sector.2 13 The view that the higher education sector is
rife with fraud and abuse is best summarized by a 1991 Senate Report on higher
education.14 The Senate Report expressed concerns about fly-by-night colleges
fleecing students and avoiding their obligations by filing for bankruptcy
protection.215 The Senate Report also suggested that IHEs "that cannot make loan
refund payments to former students may continue to admit new students who in
turn incur student loan obligations [even though that] school may well dose or
otherwise cut back its educational program."2 16
By precluding IHEs from reorganizing in bankruptcy, Congress apparently
thought it could prevent "unscrupulous profiteers" from using "their fraudulent
schools" to take advantage of "hundreds of thousands of young people, many of
whom come from backgrounds with already limited opportunities" and who would
be left with "neither the training nor the skills they hoped to acquire[,]" but would
instead be "left burdened with debts they [could not] repay."217 But, precluding
213 See U.S. Govr ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/T-HEHS-96-158, HIGHER EDUCATION:
ENSURING QUALITY EDUCATION FROM PROPRIETARY INSTITUTIONS, Testimony Before the
Subcomm. on Human Res. & Intergovernmental Relations of the H Comm. on Gov't Reform and
Oversight 1 (1996), https//www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96158t.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S8R-YRDF]
(statement of Cornelia M. Blanchette, Associate Director Education & Employment Issues, Health,
Education, and Human Services Division) (expressing "concern . . . about the integrity of Title IV
programs" because of investigations by the Department's Office of Inspector General, Congress, and the
GAO that all found "extensive fraud and abuse . . . in student aid programs"). Although "[t]he Senate
Report accompanying the [1992 amendments to the HEA] contains no specific explanation of the anti-
bankruptcy provision[,]" see Norberg, supra note 20, at 390, the concern repeatedly expressed is that
Title IV's programs are "[p]lagued by fraud and abuse at every level[,] . . . lack[] meaningful oversight
and management controls, [and, as a result have] become inefficient, ineffective, and far too costly." S.
REP. No. 102-58, at 33 (1991); see generally Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-325, 106 Star. 448 (1992).
214 See generally S. REP. No. 102-58 (discussing the pervasive reports of "waste, fraud, and abuse"
in the Guaranteed Student Loan Program, "one of seven major student financial aid programs"
authorized by Title IV of the HEA).
215 See id at 10-13 (discussing schools' fraudulent practices); id. at 19, 26, 34 (discussing schools'
ability to "secur[e] the protection of the bankruptcy court"); Lacey, supra note 53 (explaining that
Congress's anti-reorganization amendments passed in the early 1990s were explicitly intended to,
among other things, "eliminate fly-by-night institutions from the [Title IV] programs"); see also U.S.
Gov7r ACCOUNTABILTIY OFF., supra note 213, at 1 (explaining that for-profit institutions have
"enriched themselves at the expense of economically disadvantaged students while providing little or no
education in return"); REBECCA R. SKINNER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32182, INSTITUTIONAL
ELIGIBILITY AND THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 90/10 RULE
AND ITS CURRENT STATUS, at Summary Page (Jan. 19, 2005),
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/1904 [https://perma.cc/8HL3-TZ2G] (follow "View
Publication" hyperlink) ("Supporters of the 85/15 rule argued that the rule was necessary to stem
fraudulent and abusive practices that had been identified at proprietary institutions.").
216 S. REP. No. 102-58, at 19 (quoting the Inspector General's testimony).
217 Id. at 33; see also 140 CONG. REC. 20,174 (1994) (describing "victimized" students); Katherine
Porter, College Lessons: The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in BROKE: How DEBT BANKRUPTS
THE MIDDLE CLASS, 85-100 (Katherine Porter ed.) (2012) (explaining that incurring educational debt
without earning a degree can lead to bankruptcy).
2017-2018 255
KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL
IHEs from using the tools available in bankruptcy reorganization was never an
appropriate solution to this problem.218 Unsurprisingly, therefore, Congress has not
solved it.219 Ted Mitchell, the then-Undersecretary of education, recently noted,
"[U]nfortunately, in recent years, [we have] seen far too many schools maintain
their institutional accreditation even while defrauding and misleading students,
providing poor quality education, or dosing without recourse for students. This is
inexcusable[] . . . ."220
B. Three Arguments 4gvinst Precluding Bankruptcy Reorganization as a Fraud-
Prevention Tool
i. Bankruptcy Court Supervision Prevents Fraud
Congress's decision to economically preclude nearly all IHEs from reorganizing
in bankruptcy in an attempt to deter or prevent fraud may result from a poor
understanding of how bankruptcy works.22' Bankrupt enterprises are supervised by
bankruptcy courts, the United States Trustee, official committees of creditors or
equity-holders, and others.222 An explicitly stated goal of the U.S. court system is to
provide oversight mechanisms that "deter and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, and
address mistakes should they occur."223 Utilizing a system specifically focused on
the problem that Congress is concerned about seems more likely to be effective
than eliminating the "intrusive oversight" provided by the bankruptcy system.224
21s Frankly, allowing students to discharge their educational debts without demonstrating an "undue
hardship" might be a more sensible solution. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012); see also Aaron N.
Taylor, Undo Undue Hardship: An Objective Approach to Discharging Federal Student Loans in
Bankruptcy, 38 NOTRE DAMvE J. LEGIS. 185, 187-90 (2012) (advocating for the elimination of the
"undue hardship" standard).
21' Neither Congress nor other governmental entities have come up with a solution. The "triad" of
accreditation, state licensure, and ED certification do not, generally, appear to provide sufficient
oversight over IHEs. SKINNER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32182, at 4 (referring to three-part
regulatory structure of accreditation, licensure, and institutional eligibility as the "triad").
220 Collin Binkley, Feds Consider Whether to Shut For-Profit College Watchdog, AP NEWS (June
11, 2016), http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/21f8481883144f4b85edd03337def233/feds-consider-
whether-shut-profit-college-watchdog [https.//perma.cc/Y8XH-3FGD].
" Norberg, supra note 20, at 392 ("[T]he rationale that unscrupulous or fraudulent institutions
found refuge in bankruptcy to the detriment of the [Department of Education] and students is
misplaced."); see also Hearings Before Permanent Subcomm., supra note 212, at 14 (testifying
inaccurately that the automatic stay prevents any actions from being taken against an IHE during the
lifetime of the bankruptcy proceeding). Cf In re Vitalsigns Homecare, Inc., 396 B.R 232, 239-41
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (noting that the bankruptcy of medical enterprises can protect both taxpayers
and patients).
" See infra notes 225-228 and accompanying text.
m Administrative Oversight and Accountabilty, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/judicial-administration/administrative-oversight-and-accountability
[https-//perma.cc/5HXH-ARPE] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
22 David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should BankruptcyBe an Option (for People, Places, or Things)?, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2248 (2014) (noting the "intrusive oversight" that occurs in bankruptcy).
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Most notably, when fraud has occurred, bankruptcy courts are empowered to
appoint a trustee to manage the bankrupt entity (thereby displacing the debtor's
existing management).2 5 If fraud is merely suspected, bankruptcy courts may
appoint an examiner to investigate potential improprieties.226 Section 1104 of the
Bankruptcy Code mandates the appointment of a trustee "for cause, including
fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement" and permits
appointment of a trustee whenever such appointment would benefit creditors,
shareholders, or "other interests of the estate."227 Section 1104 also permits an
examiner to be appointed to investigate "any allegations of fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of
the affairs of the debtor . . . ."228 Although a debtor's existing management typically
remains in control of the enterprise, the power to displace existing management or
to investigate potential shenanigans should reduce (rather than exacerbate)
fraudulent conduct by bankrupt enterprises.
The 1991 Senate Report noted above expressed a particular concern with IHEs
retaining students' undisbursed Title IV funds.2 2 9 Yet, a debtor may not retain such
funds simply because it has filed for bankruptcy any more than a debtor may retain
funds owed to any other creditors.23o In fact, bankruptcy provides a debtor23' with
certain rights to recover the debtor's property that are unavailable outside of
bankruptcy.23 2 For example, § 547 allows a debtor to recover certain payments
made to creditors in the period immediately preceding a bankruptcy filing, even
when the payment was lawfully made and the debtor owes the creditor a valid
debt.233 These Bankruptcy Code provisions aim to prevent debtors from making
payments that benefit some creditors at the expense of others (such as students) in
the months leading up to a bankruptcy filing, or, if such payments were made, to
recover them for the creditors' benefit. In other words, bankruptcy oversight should
make it less (rather than more) likely for an IHIE to unlawfully retain and use
students' undisbursed Title IV funds.
325 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (discussing the appointment of a trustee or examiner); see also
Bruckner, supra note 116, at 267-68 (discussing trustee appointments).
226 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104; see also Bruckner, supra note 116, at 280-83 (discussing examiner
appointments).
327 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (emphasis added.
228 Id. § 1104(c) (emphasis added) .
229 See S. REP. NO. 102-58, at 1-2, 6-7, 10, 17, 33-44 (1991) (discussing the lack of oversight over
Title IV funds). Congress eventually addressed this concern in 34 C.F.R. § 668.22(a) (1992) (setting
standards regarding an IHE's ability to retain Title IV funds when students withdraw from school).
22o See Skeel, supra note 224, at 2235-36.
221 Or, if a debtor will not bring such actions, it may empower an official committee to act in the
debtor's stead. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1103.
232 See id §§ 542, 544, 547-548, 550; see also Norberg, supra note 20, at 392-93 (discussing the
right to recoup certain preferential payments or fraudulent conveyances that might not be available
under state law).
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 547. Preference actions focus on whether the creditor would end up with better
treatment than other creditors because of the allegedly preferential payment. Id.
2017-oi8 257
KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL
Although there might appear to be a facial connection between failing to return
Title IV funds and filing bankruptcy, other factors are more likely to explain an
IHE's decision not to make anticipated loan refund payments to students. More
likely culprits include that the debtor lacks sufficient assets, or that other creditors
have a higher repayment priority, a priority set by Congress.234 As Scott Norberg
made dear, "[T]he concern that bankruptcy permitted bankrupt higher education
institutions to avoid loan refund and security bond obligations is misplaced. These
problems arise from the lack of adequate ... oversight [by the ED] and insufficient
debtor assets, not from the act of filing for bankruptcy."ns Although fraudulent
intent could explain an IHE's decision not to make refund payments, judicial
oversight is much more likely to deter or prevent fraud.236
ii. Bankruptcy Reorganization Alternatives Are Not Precluded
Even assuming it was appropriate to effectively preclude IHEs from using the
tools available in bankruptcy reorganization, doing so would not be sufficient by
itself. IHEs may still be able to use state law alternatives, such as assignment for
the benefit of creditors (an "ABC")m to accomplish something akin to a voluntary
bankruptcy reorganization without losing access to Title IV funds.238 Assuming
that a voluntary bankruptcy reorganization increases the likelihood of fraud, it is
not dear why an IHE should be allowed to take an alternative path to the same end
and retain its Title IV eligibility. Yet, Title IV eligibility is cut off only when "the
institution . . . has filed for bankruptcy."n An institution that makes an ABC has
plainly not filed for bankruptcy. Instead, it has initiated an ABC, which is not at all
the same thing. Thus, a plain reading of the statutory language would appear to
exclude an ABC from terminating an IHE's Title IV eligibility. This strategy could
offer something of a work-around for IHEs.24
234 See id. § 507 (setting forth the repayment priority scheme for distributions in bankruptcy cases);
see also Norberg, supra note 20, at 392-93, 398-99.
235 Norberg, supra note 20, at 392.
26 See id. at 391-93.
1 For more information about assignments for the benefit of creditors, see Andrew B. Dawson,
Better Than Bankmptcy?, 69 RUTGERS U.L. REv. 137, 145-49 (2016) (describing the procedures
followed in an assignment for the benefit of creditors, with an emphasis on how it is different from
chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code).
" ABCs may be a viable alternative to chapter 11 reorganization for some IHEs. See id at 150
(reporting that Florida's ABC laws are being used as a "viable alternative to federal bankruptcy relief").
But see Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016) (suggestion that
most bankruptcy-like, state-level action on behalf of public entities may be preempted by § 903(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code). This does not appear to have been the case at the time Title IV was amended to
effectively preclude the bankruptcy reorganizations of IHEs.
' 20 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4)(A) (2012); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text (indicating that
involuntary bankruptcies may also terminate a school's Title IV eligibility).
2 Still, this strategy is risky because the ED, state licensing agencies, or accrediting agencies may
take actions that would negatively affect an IHE's ability to access Title IV funds. CE §§ 362(b)(14) -
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In addition, IHEs can use the bankruptcy system or state law receiverships to
liquidate.2 4' Apparently, Congress was not concerned about he possibility of
profiteers opening fly-by-night schools to defraud students and then liquidating in
bankruptcy or state court, even though students would be left with little recourse in
those instances. Although an IHE will lose its Title IV eligibility by filing a
voluntary bankruptcy liquidation, that hardly matters in a liquidation proceeding.242
Bankruptcy liquidations, typically done under chapter 7, and state law receiverships
offer an orderly way to cease operations and wind down an entity's affairs. Thus,
continued Title IV eligibility is unlikely to be particularly important. More to the
point, it does not matter to students that have been defrauded. Given that an IHE
can reorganize in bankruptcy if Title IV eligibility is not relevant, and may be able
to use state law restructuring alternatives if it is, precluding IHEs only from
voluntary reorganizations is peculiar. It is also apparently divorced from the end it
purports to achieve.
iii. Far Fewer Taxpayer Dollars Are at Risk of Being Misappropriated in Higher
Education Cases
Finally, Congress might rationally restrict access to bankruptcy reorganization if
doing so would protect taxpayer dollars, but far fewer taxpayer dollars are at stake
in the higher education industry than in the healthcare industry. In 2016, the
federal government spent approximately one trillion dollars on healthcare.24 3 By
contrast, the federal government spent approximately $76 billion on higher
education in 2013.2" Put differently, the federal government spends approximately
fourteen times more on healthcare than on higher education each year. Even the
total of all outstanding student loan debt, most of it either government-guaranteed
or lent directly by the government, is only approximately equivalent to the
government's annual healthcare expenditures.2 45 Finally, the estimated amount of
(16) In addition, non-bankruptcy restructuring options are generally thought to be less vibrant than
chapter 11 restructuring. See Dawson, supra note 237, at 141-42. It is also worth noting that they may
no longer be available for public IHEs. See Franklin Cal Tax-Free Tnust, 136 S. Ct. at 1942.
241 For more information about receiverships, see Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11
Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 584-87 (1993) (describing
the procedures followed in equity receiverships, which are described as "the historical antecedent to the
present Chapter 11").
242 SeeJim Christie, ITTEducational Services Fdes for Bankruptcy to Start Liquidation, RELTERS
(Sept. 16, 2016, 10:40 PM), http//www.reuters.com/article/us-itt-education-bankruptcy-
idUSKCN11N01U [https://perma.cc/WD4H-8RND] (noting that ITT, a for-profit college chain, had
begun a bankruptcy liquidation soon after it lost access to Tide IV).
243 Nationa Health Expenditures Fact Sheet, supra note 210 ($618.7 billion for Medicare and
$495.8 billion for Medicaid); see also Maizel, et al., supra note 44, at 257.
244 See Woodhouse, supra note 185.
245 See supra text accompanying note 188; see also Student Loan Debt Statistics 2017, STUDENT
LOAN REP., https//studentloans.net/student-loan-debt-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/9W9X-NRSX]
(last visited Jan. 5, 2018) (estimating national student loan debt was approximately $1.41 trillion in
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waste, fraud, and abuse in healthcare ($70 billion) is approximately equal to the
federal government's annual yearly expenditure on higher education ($76 billion). 246
If bankruptcy reorganization somehow increased the risk of fraud upon
taxpayers, we would expect access to bankruptcy would be more limited for the
industries that enjoyed greater federal subsidies than for entities that enjoyed
smaller ones.2 4 7 But the opposite is true. Healthcare enterprises receive far larger
amounts of taxpayer dollars but enjoy greater access to bankruptcy reorganization.
It is unclear, therefore, how taxpayers are adequately protected in healthcare
reorganizations but would not be in higher education reorganizations. Though it
ought to be otherwise if bankruptcy encourages fraud, the degree of federal
fmancing alone seems unrelated to whether bankruptcy reorganization is available
or not. Unless IHEs are enormously more likely to commit fraud than healthcare
enterprises (and bankruptcy courts could not deter or prevent that fraud), the sheer
volume of taxpayer dollars at risk of being misappropriated suggests that it is
irrational to allow healthcare enterprises to reorganize but not higher education
enterprises.2
C Two Counter-argurents in Favor of Treating Higher Education and
Healthcare Enterpises Differently
But, there are at least two counter-arguments why IHEs should not be allowed
to reorganize even though healthcare enterprises can reorganize.249 The first
2017); CDC, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2016: WITH
CHARTBOOK ON LONG-TERM TRENDS IN HEALTH 3, 318-20 tbL95 (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/husl6.pdf [https://perma.cc/MPR7-AJNE] (estimating federal
spending on personal health care was approximately $1.3 trillion in 2016).
246 See U.S. Govr ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-475, FRAUD DETECTION SYSTEMS:
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES NEEDS TO ENSURE MORE WIDESPREAD USE
1 (June 2011), https://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320854.pdf [https://perma.cc/95GH-EYPH]
(discussing the approximate amount of improper Medicare and Medicaid payments made in 2010); see
also U.S. Gov7 ACCOUNTABILIY OFF., GAO-11-842T, IMPROPER PAYMENTS: REPORTED
MEDICARE ESTIMATES AND KEY REMEDIATION STRATEGIES, TestimonyBefore the Subcomm. on
Gov't Org., Eiiciency &Fin. Mgmt. of the H Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Refonn 4-S (July 2011),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/126770.pdf [https-//perma.cc/CM7X-32GG] (finding that improper
Medicare payments alone were approximately $48 billion); supra note 244 and accompanying text.
247 In addition, the federal government should understand it is often likely to recover more in a
reorganization than in a liquidation. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 118, at 3-4, 24 ("[D]ebtors
who reorganize have substantially higher recovery ratios than debtors who sell.").
248 There may be a greater risk of fraud in the higher education industry than in the healthcare
industry. In contrast to higher education, in the healthcare industry, the federal government imposes
some price controls in an attempt "to avoid abuse and self-dealing." See CBR, Comment to Involuntary
Collegiate "Do Not Resuscitate" Orders, supra note 35 (Sept. 14, 2016, 3:26 PM).
" Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code may also explain the disparate treatment, but it is an
argument grounded in the current law, rather than a normative argument about what the law should be.
Section 525(a) protects all debtors against discriminatory treatment by the government because of a
bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2012). In the healthcare context, courts have not allowed
HHS or CMS to terminate a healthcare provider's Medicare eligibility because of its bankruptcy filing.
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counter-argument is that fraud is more likely to occur in the higher education
sector because there are fewer anti-fraud measures in place.250 For example, the
accreditation process for healthcare enterprises appears to be more robust than the
accreditation process for IHEs.25' Second, healthcare enterprises serve a more
See Samuel R Maizel & Rachel Caplan, Chicken Litte Comes to Roost in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR,
INST. J., July 1, 2006, https*//www.abi.org/abi-journal/chicken-little-comes-to-roost-in-
bankruptcy-why-362b28-doesnt-mean-the-sky-is-falling [https://perma.cc/3LMZ-FT54]; see aso
Lacktman & Owens, supru note 198. By contrast, courts have allowed the ED to terminate an IHE's
Title IV eligibility because of its bankruptcy filing. See, c.g, U.S. Dep't of Educ. v. Betty Owen Sch.,
Inc. (In re Betty Owen Sch., Inc.), 195 B.R. 23, 27-28, 31-34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). The reason for
the difference in treatment appears to be because of a common maxim of statutory interpretation: that
the specific controls the general. See id at 33 (stating that one of the canons of statutory interpretation
is that "courts are bound by Congressional judgments that general bankruptcy policy give way to more
specific policy considerations") (quoting Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 164 (3d Cir.
1984)). Both courts to consider the 525(a) issue in the higher education context found that Congress
made a specific policy choice to deny an IHE access to Title IV programs if it files for bankruptcy,
which "must override the general 'fresh start' policy of § 525(a)." Will Hueske, Schools Out Forever:
Lon Moris College, Section 525(?), and Revocation of Title IVEgiblity for Institutions of Higher
Education in Bankruptcy, WEIL: BANKR. BLOG (Apr. 9, 2013), http://business-
finance-restructuring.weiLcom/government/schools-out-forever-lon-morris-college-section-525a-and-
revocation-of-title-iv-eligibility-for-institutions-of-higher-education-in-bankruptcy/
[https*//perma.cc/YR6E-4TNN]. In other words, courts have found that the general policy of providing
debtors with a "fresh start" must be subordinated to the language of section 362(b)(16) allowing the
Secretary of Education to take "any action" regarding a debtor's eligibility to participate in the Title IV
programs. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(16) (2012); see also In re Betty Owen Schools, Inc., 195 B.R. at
32-33 (noting in addition that the legislative history makes clear Congress's intention to "curtail the
'fresh start' of a debtor school which relies on federal funding"). By contrast, Congress used much less
sweeping language in the healthcare context. Section 362(b)(28) merely grants authority to the Secretary
of HHS to exclude a debtor from Medicare. See id. § 362(b)(28). But, exclusion is a term of art and a
bankruptcy filing is not one of the specifically enumerated reasons for excluding a debtor from
Medicare. Cf Maizel & Caplan, supra, Lacktman & Owens, supra note 198. Courts have not found
that the less expansive language of section 362(b)(28) overrides the general policy of providing debtors
with a fresh start.
250 See supra note 248.
251 Some allege that higher education accreditors merely rubber-stamp the accreditation requests of
IHEs, calling them "the 'watchdogs that don't bark.'" See Paul Fain, Getting Tough with a Gatekeeper,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (une 16, 2016), https*//www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/06/15/education-
department-recommends-eliminating-national-accreditor-many-profit-colleges
[https-//perma.cc/4YM5-BPZT] (quoting Arne Duncan, former federal Secretary of Education). In one
recent high-profile example, Corinthian Colleges's accreditor, ACICS, found "'few if any quality issues'
at the chain's [fifty-nine] campuses despite the flurry of state and federal investigations Corinthian was
facing" and even though Corinthian was shut down soon after it was re-accredited. See id. At one time,
the healthcare accreditation process appeared to have been similar to the higher education accreditation
process, but the healthcare accreditation process has since been partially co-opted by state and federal
governments. See Paul M. Schyve, The Evolution of External Qualty Evaluation: Observations from
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 12 INT'L J. FOR QUALITY
HEALTH CARE 255, 255-57 (2000). Since 1982, the most significant healthcare accreditor, the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, has included members of the public on its
governing board and on its professional and technical committees. Id at 256. In addition, the federal
government has begun to help set the standards that accreditors must use, instead of leaving the
standard-setting solely to the accrediting agencies. Id. ("As the federal government began to fund other
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vulnerable population than IHEs. Therefore, Congress may allow healthcare
enterprises to reorganize-despite the risk of fraud-because patient lives are at
stake, but choose not to allow IHEs to reorganize because students will not literally
die if IHEs are effectively precluded from bankruptcy reorganization. On balance,
this Article argues that these counter-arguments are insufficient to justify denying
IHE's access to bankruptcy reorganization. Nevertheless, they bear discussing.252
The first counter-argument is that there is greater oversight of healthcare
enterprises than of higher education enterprises, which would make fraud less likely
in the healthcare industry. 3 Greater oversight of healthcare enterprises appears to
come in the form of stricter accreditation standards and more regular and intrusive
inspections. 254 In addition, it appears that a larger percentage of healthcare
expenditures are paid out-of-pocket than higher education expenditures, which
may reflect an independent judgment by consumers that a particular enterprise is
not a fly-by-night or sham enterprise likely to defraud patients.2 s5 Finally, the
care settings, it established standards for home care, laboratories, ambulatory surgery centers, and
hospices").252 There are surely other potential counter-arguments that could be raised too, including a moral
hazard argument. Congress might rationally decline to accept the increased risk of moral hazard in one
industry unless there is some off-setting benefit. For example, the increased moral hazard may be an
acceptable trade off in the healthcare industry but not the higher education industry if Congress also
believes that patients are at a greater risk of harm without a bankruptcy reorganization option. See
Bruckner, supra note 25, at 722-23, 726-27 (discussing the effects of bankruptcy reorganization on the
risk of moral hazard); see also supra note 174 and accompanying text ("[W[hen hospitals die, people
die."); supra notes 193-195 and accompanying text (highlighting the immediate detrimental impact of
IHEs' loss of federal funding).
253 Of course, as noted above, there may be fewer fraud-prevention tools in higher education merely
because they are effectively precluded from bankruptcy reorganization. See supra notes 248, 250 and
accompanying text.
24 See supra note 251 and accompanying text; Lacktman & Owens, supm note 198 (describing the
Medicare inspection process as a periodic survey "to verify substantial compliance with [Medicare]
Program requirements").
255 For example, in 1998, nearly one-third of revenue generated by nursing homes was paid out-of-
pocket. See U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/T-HEHS-00-192, NURSING HOMES:
AGGREGATE MEDICARE PAYMENTS ARE ADEQUATE DESPITE BANKRUPTCIES, Testimony Before
the Special S. Comm. on Aging 2-3 (2000), https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/108613.pdf
[https-//perma.cc/MET5-8PSJ] (stating that "Medicaid accounted for [forty-six] percent of total
nursing home expenditures" in 1998, with Medicare (twelve percent), out of pocket (thirty-three
percent), and private insurance (five percent) covering the rest). By contrast, the federal government has
had to put in place rules requiring that at least ten percent of revenue generated by for-profit IHEs is
paid out-of-pocket, and even this so-called 90/10 rule can be circumvented because certain government
revenue streams, such as those from the G.I. Bill, count toward the ten percent. See supra notes 90, 192
and accompanying text, see also Aaron Glantz, Txpayer Funds Are Lifelne for More than 100 For-
Profit Schools, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Oct. 9, 2014),
https://www.revealnews.org/article-legacy/taxpayer-funds-are-lifeline-for-more-than-100-for-profit-
schools/ [https://perma.cc/BWF8-LJC9]. In addition, the ten percent of non-Title IV dollars does not
require out-of-pocket expenditures but can represent loans by an IHE itself. See, e.g., Bruckner, supra
note 90. Some IHEs have found it worthwhile to issue loans even if those loans are unlikely to be repaid
because it enables them to extract additional government dollars. See id.
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government has a price-setting role in the healthcare context that they do not have
in the higher education context.256
While all of this is true, it is not relevant to the question of whether allowing
IHEs to reorganize in bankruptcy would increase the risk of fraud in that industry.
In this case, the appropriate comparison is not between IHEs and healthcare
enterprises, but between IHEs that can reorganize in bankruptcy and ones that
cannot. And, as noted above, there does not seem to be any added risk of fraud on
taxpayers in a bankruptcy reorganization than outside of one-rather the opposite
would seem to be true.257
The second possible rationale for allowing healthcare enterprises to reorganize
in bankruptcy but not IHEs is because the healthcare industry serves a more
vulnerable population. If allowing an enterprise the opportunity to reorganize in
bankruptcy would increase the risk of harm to consumers, bankruptcy
reorganization may be inappropriate. Similarly, if allowing an enterprise the
opportunity to reorganize in bankruptcy would decrease the risk of harm to
consumers, bankruptcy reorganization may be appropriate. In both the higher
education and healthcare sectors, there is a risk of harm to consumers if a facility
doses. But, it may be thought that the risk of harm to patients is sufficiently severe
to justify allowing healthcare facilities to reorganize, but that the risk of harm to
students is not sufficiently severe.
When an IHE closes, existing students may choose to finish their degree
elsewhere or students can apply to have any federal student loans related to
attending that IHE discharged.2ss And both former students and students who
would have attended had the school remained open may choose to attend a
different IHE.259 The effect on students appears limited to a disruption in their
education." Similarly, when a healthcare facility closes, existing patients must be
transferred to another facility and future patients must choose a different facility,
256 See supra note 248.
257 See supra notes 221-236 and accompanying text.
258 See Closed School Discharge, FED. STUDENT AID, https*//studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-
loans/forgiveness-cancellation/closed-school#benefits [https://perma.cc/BQL7-LN3K] (last visited Jan.
5,2018).
259 Students may also lose credit hours or be unable to transfer to another school, and students who
acquire education debt but do not complete their degree are at a higher risk of needing to file a personal
bankruptcy case. See Porter, supra note 217, at 85-89 (stating that incurring educational debt without
earning a degree can lead to bankruptcy).
260 This is not meant to downplay the effects of failing to complete one's education, including the
resultant limited employment prospects. Moreover, it remains disruptive to a student's education, even if
the now-closed school implements a so-called "teach out" plan. See 34 C.F.R § 668.14(b)(31); see also
Alexandra Hegji, The Closure of Institutions of Hgher Education: Student Options, Borrower Rehef
and Irnplcations, CONG. RESEARCH. SRVC. (Jan. 12, 2017) ("To participate in the Tite IV federal
student aid programs, an THE must, among other requirements, agree to submit a teach-out plan to its
accrediting agency, if it intends to close a location that provides 100% of at least one educational
program offered by the IHE or if it intends to otherwise cease operations.").
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often one that is further away.61 Thus, at first glance, the effects on both patients
and students appear similar. But, when a healthcare facility closes, it can also place
patients' lives at risk. Educational disruptions seem more appropriately described as
an inconvenience when compared to the increased risk of a patient's dying because
that patient had to travel fiurther to receive medical care.62
Thus, there may be a stronger case for allowing healthcare enterprises to
reorganize than for allowing IHEs to reorganize. But, that students do not die
when IHEs dose, does not suggest that IHEs should not be precluded from the
opportunity to be resuscitated in a bankruptcy proceeding, and for the reasons
stated above, there is still a strong case for allowing IHEs to reorganize.
CONCLUSION
This Article has compared the higher education and healthcare industries to
highlight the incongruence of allowing virtually every type of enterprise to use the
tools available in bankruptcy reorganization except for IHEs. As argued above,
effectively precluding the bankruptcy reorganization of IHEs is ill-conceived and
deprives IHEs of access to an important set of tools available to virtually every
other type of entity-both for-profit and nonprofit. Moreover, precluding the
bankruptcy reorganization of IHEs has been ineffective at protecting students from
fraudulent higher education operators, which was Congress's sole apparent
justification. " Effectively precluding higher education reorganization cases
condemns many IHEs to an unnecessary death.' And, given the similarities
between higher education and healthcare enterprises, precluding the former from
reorganizing in bankruptcy appears particularly senseless. 2
261 This is particularly true in rural areas rather than urban ones. See, e.g., Jayne O'Donnell & Laura
Ungar, Ruand Hospita in Critical Condition, USA TODAY (Nov. 12, 2014),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/12/rural-hospital-dosings-federal-
reimbursement-medicaid-aca/18532471/ [https-//perma.cc/F6XT-X47D].
262 Trauma patients are more likely to survive if they receive medical care more quickly. See Charlie
Eisele, The Golden Hour, J. EMERGENCY MED. SERVICES (Aug. 31, 2008),
http://www.jems.com/articles/2008/08/golden-hour.html [https://perma.cc/YJ73-MYT9].
' See Norberg, supra note 20, at 390-92; supra note 220 and accompanying text, see also
Bruckner, supra note 85 (noting that ITT Tech-a for-profit chain of colleges-was accused of fraud
before it closed its campuses in late 2016).
* See supra text accompanying notes 17-21, 35.
265 See supra text accompanying notes 35-45.
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